2015考研英语阅读操之过急的巴塞尔

　　Bank capital;Half-cockedBasel

　　银行资本;操之过急的巴塞尔;

　　Stop-gap rules on banks trading books may addperilous complexity.

　　把银行交易帐户作为权宜之计可能增加了危险的复杂性。

　　The nnew year hangover throbbed agonisingly forinvestment bankers this year. Blame Basel 2.5, anew set of international rules which charges bankshigher capital for the risks they run in their tradingbooks . Those charges were too low before.And heaping higher costs on banks should please politicians and Joe Public. But they addanother layer of complexity to banks risk management.

　　今年，新年遗留问题沉闷地牵动了投资银行家的神经。这都得归咎于巴塞尔协议2.5版，这是一套新的国际规则，它针对银行交易帐户中操作的风险性资产收取更多费用。以前收取的费用太低了。银行成本累加应该会讨政治家和普通百姓的喜欢。但是他们给银行的风险管理增加了另外一层复杂性。

　　Basel 2.5 came into force on December 31st in most European and major world financialjurisdictions. Switzerland applied the rules a year early, and the costs are substantial.Third-quarter figures for Credit Suisse show a 28% increase in risk-weighted assets, andhence capital charges, for its investment-banking activities purely because of Basel 2.5.

　　12月31日，巴塞尔2.5在欧洲大部分地区和世界主要金融辖区开始实施。瑞士一年前贯彻了这一法规，成本很高。瑞士信贷第三季度数据显示风险加权资产增长了28%，因为巴塞尔2.5，今后资本费用仅仅是针对投行业务的。

　　The most notable laggard is America. US financial regulators do not oppose Basel 2.5, but itclashes with the Dodd-Frank act, America s big wet blanket of a financial reform. Basel 2.5uses credit ratings from recognised agencies such as Moody s and Standard Poor s tocalibrate capital charges. Dodd-Frank expressly forbids the use of such ratings agencies,whose poor judgments are held partly responsible for the crisis. Instead American regulatorsare working on their own cocktail of credit-risk calibrations for Basel 2.5, using market dataand country-risk ratings from the OECD. Their solution is still months away fromapplication .

　　最引人注意的拖延者是美国。美国金融监管机构并不反对巴塞尔2.5，但是巴塞尔2.5与美国大的金融监管改革法案《多德-弗兰克法案》却存在冲突。巴塞尔2.5使用的信誉评级从评级机构穆迪和标准普尔到校准资本收费。《多德-弗兰克法案》特别禁止了使用评级机构，他们匮乏的判断力对危机负有部分责任。而美国的校准人都忙于利用来自世界经济合作发展组织的市场数据和国家风险评级，应付他们自己在巴塞尔 2.5下的信用风险校验。他们的方案距离实施仍有数月之久

　　Basel 2.5 for the first time charges banks extra capital for the credit risk of what they hold intheir trading portfolio . That includes a charge for the risk that a counterparty goesbust. It also imposes heavy charges on securitised bundles of assets unless the credit risk ofeach piece of the bundle has an identifiable market price. Banks that have portfolios oftrading positions which they reckon offset each other have to convince regulators that theirrisk models work or face being charged at a cruder, standardised rate.

　　巴塞尔2.5第一次针对于银行交易性资产的信贷风险收取额外费用。这包括了交易对象破产的风险。它也对资产证券化产品征收了高额的费用，除非产品包中每种资产的信贷风险有明确的市场标价。那些自己认为拥有彼此抵消投资组合的银行必须说服监管机构他们所使用或者面临的风险模型正在被以野蛮的、标准的费率收费。

　　The problem with Basel 2.5, recognised by regulators and bankers alike, is its complexity.The risk of a trading portfolio must now be broken down into five bucketsvalue at risk, a measure of how much could be lost in an average trading day; stressed VaR ; plus three types of credit risk ranging from therisk of single credits to those of securitised loans. Traders are understandably confused. Forsome banks, developing risk models and getting them approved is just too expensive: morecomplex businesses will be shut down. That will please those who want banks to be moreboring.

　　监管机构和银行家似乎承认了巴塞尔2.5 问题的复杂性。交易性资产的风险现在必须分解成五个桶：风险值，估计平均每个交易日的可能损失;极限风险值;再加上三个不同类别的信用风险值，从单个信贷风险到抵押贷款依次排列。交易员都觉得很困惑。对于一些银行而言，开发风险模型并获得通过成本太高了：更复杂的业务将被停止。这将使一些想让银行更加令人厌烦的人非常满意。

　　But unintended consequences will doubtless follow. Useful products may become lesstradable. Trading of riskier products could migrate to unregulated entities. Banks may betempted into new forms of regulatory arbitrage, by juggling assets between their tradingbook and their banking book. Worst of all, perhaps, is the increased risk of back-officebungling because of the extra complexity.

　　但是这无疑将招致意外的后果。实用的产品交易量会减少。风险产品的交易可能转移至不受监管的实体。银行可能会被交易账户和银行账户之间变换的资产诱惑，进入一套新的监管套利模式。最坏的情况可能是由于额外的复杂性造成的后台拙劣的工作风险增加 。

　　Regulators recognise this risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which drew upthe rules and is also responsible for the full Basel 3 regime that will come into force in 2019,is still conducting what it calls a fundamental review of capital rules for banks tradingbooks. Publication is not expected before March. Those sore heads will not soon clear.

　　监管部门认识到了这种风险。起草规则并负责2019年开始执行的全部的巴塞尔3的巴塞尔委员会银行监督机构，仍在指挥着他们称之为对银行交易账户的资金制度基本审查的行动。三月前是不会发行官方文件的。头疼的问题也一时不会被解决。