2015考研英语阅读拼拼凑凑见真相

　　Piecing it together

　　拼拼凑凑见真相

　　All The Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of theFinancial Crisis. By Bethany McLean and JoeNocera.

　　《万魔聚此：金融危机隐藏的历史》，Bethany McLean和 Joe Nocera著。

　　The latest book on the financial crisis has an oddtitle. You begin reading All the Devils Are Here, aline from Shakespeare s The Tempest, expectingto encounter satanic bankers and corrupt government cronies preying on a defencelesspublic. In fact the people who emerge are infinitely more interesting: arrogant, desperate,even cluelessbut, with a few exceptions, not devils.

　　这本最新出炉的讨论经济危机的书有个奇怪的名字。万魔聚此，读到这句出自莎士比亚《暴风雨》剧中的对白，你可能会觉得书中讲的应该是穷凶极恶的银行家和与之狼狈为奸的腐败政府官员如何如何侵害毫无招架之力的公众。但实际上里面提及的人物却比这耐人寻味得多：傲慢者、铤而走险者，甚至还有无知之徒，但除了少数人之外，他们都算不上恶魔。

　　Take Angelo Mozilo. From the time he started Countrywide Financial in the late 1960s theBronx-born outsider was convinced he could put millions of deserving families in homes,maintain impeccable underwriting standardsand get rich. That became impossible as thesubprime mania grew. By 2006 Mr Mozilo had a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde quality, the authorsnote, giving warning that disaster loomed while at the same time insisting his companywould still thrive. In fact, Countrywide had become a leading purveyor of toxic mortgageproducts that would take the company to the brink of bankruptcy.

　　就拿安吉罗莫兹罗来说吧。当他在20世纪60年代末创立全国金融公司时，这位出生在纽约布朗克斯区的门外汉深信，自己能够帮助数百万应该得到帮助的家庭获得一个属于他们自己的家，同时维持无懈可击的承保标准 然后发家致富。可是随着次级贷的热狂逐步升温，这一切预想都化为泡影。本书作者指出，到2006年时，莫兹罗先生已经有人格分裂的趋势了，他一方面发出警告说大难就要临头，另一方面却仍然坚信自己的公司还能兴旺发达下去。可事实上，全国金融公司当时已是有毒抵押贷款产品最大的承办商，这足已让它濒临破产。

　　Similar tensions prevailed across Wall Street. Inside Merrill Lynch and AIG, senior executivesworried as far back as 2005 and 2006 about their firms exposure to the mortgage market.The Cassandras in these companies were ignored, sidelined or fired, not because their bosseswere corrupt, but because they didn t believe the warnings. Joe Cassano, theshort-tempered head of AIG s infamous financial-products division, worried about creditlosses but apparently not about the possibility of multiple, massive collateral calls, whichproved the firm s undoing. Stan O Neal, Merrill s head, had no idea that his firm hadaccumulated fatal levels of subprime exposure because he had pushed aside the people whomight have warned him. Goldman Sachs was spared the fate of those companies largelybecause its managers listened to its naysayers.

　　类似的紧张气氛盛行于华尔街。美林证券和AIG的高管们早在2005年、2006年时就已经开始担心公司涉足抵押贷款市场将会带来隐忧。公司内部预见到这种噩运的预言家们被置之不理，得不到重视，甚至被炒了鱿鱼，原因却不是因为老板贪污受贿，而是因为他们根本就不相信这些警告。AIG声名狼藉的金融产品部主管乔-卡萨诺脾气暴躁，当时他确实对信用损失的状况不太放心，但却没有考虑过可能产生巨量的复合抵押品要求，而这却最终导致该公司的崩溃。美林证券的头儿斯坦奥尼尔把本可能规劝警告他的人都打入冷宫，因此根本没有意识到公司已经累积了致命数额的次级贷。而高盛之所以能够逃脱这些公司的噩运，很大程度上是因为其高管听进去了逆耳的忠言。

　　Much of the history that Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera recount has already appeared innews accounts, books, government investigations and court proceedings. Still, they havesynthesised an impressive amount of that material and supplemented it with their ownreporting to produce a comprehensive and authoritative account. Lesser-known eventsand individuals take on new prominence, such as the 1986 tax law that made it possible toslice up mortgage-backed securities, and the important role played by Ameriquest and itspolitically deft founder, Roland Arnall, in leading the race to the bottom in subprimestandards.

　　本瑟尼麦克里恩和乔诺瑟拉在书中讲述的危机历史大部分都已经在资讯报道、书籍、政府调查报告和庭审文件中得到披露。不过，他们的长处在于，将数量相当可观的材料加以整合，并加入自己的独家报道，形成了关于这场危机历程的全面而权威的阐述。先前相比较而言被忽略的事件和人物重新得到重视，比如使得拆分抵押证券成为可能的《1986年税法》，还有阿姆莱奎斯特抵押公司及其政治手腕高杆的创始人罗兰阿尔诺在主导这场次级贷评定标准直线下降的竞赛中所起的重要作用。

　　Inevitably, some important chapters of the crisis get short shrift. The collapse of BearStearns and Lehman Brothers get only a few pages each, which may not matter so muchbecause they have been so thoroughly covered elsewhere. The macroeconomic forces behindthe bubble, such as low interest rates at home and abroad, are all but ignored. Indeed, theauthors never wander beyond America s shores. Ms McLean and Mr Nocera, who write forVanity Fair and the New York Times, have reporters penchant for detail. The litany ofnames, numbers and financial jargon is at times exhausting, even with the help of aneight-page cast of characters and two-page glossary of acronyms. And there are too manypointless, anonymous quotes.

　　篇幅有限，危机中的某些重头戏不可避免地被简略带过。对贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟公司崩溃的讨论在书中都只有寥寥几页。不过这样处理也并无不妥，因为它们已经被说烂了。另外，这场泡沫后面的宏观经济因素则完全被忽略掉了。两位作者的关注点始终没有超出美国的范围。麦克里恩女士和诺色拉先生为《名利场》和《纽约时报》撰稿，具有记者对细节的强烈偏好。即使坐着列出了长达八页的人物表和两页的缩略语表，文中对人名、数字和金融术语的罗列有时还是让人吃不消。毫无意义且不知出处的引用也实在太多。

　　Ultimately, though, their journalistic approach is the central contribution of their book. Itsbalanced and complex portrayal of the roots of the crisis won t satisfy those who really dosee devils at work; but it is closer to the truth.

　　不过，归根到底，这本书最大的贡献就是作者采用的资讯报道立场。书中对这场危机的根源进行的刻画有些平均，比较复杂。这很难让确实看到魔鬼们在使坏的人感到满意;但却更为接近真相。