俄罗斯能够摆脱普京铁腕

Dealing with Russia has never been simple. In geographical size it is immense. In politicalculture it is secretive and as tough as nails. “Containment was the order of the day whenSoviet communism held sway. Then the west, seized with the fanciful notion that post-SovietRussia would blossom into a free-market democracy, with a middle class wedded to peace,property and the rule of law, made an effort to build a “strategic partnership with Moscow.

和俄罗斯打交道从来都不是件简单的事情。从地理面积上说，俄罗斯幅员辽阔。在政治文化方面，俄罗斯是隐秘和铁血无情的。在苏联共产党掌权的时候，“遏制是西方对俄政策的主旋律。苏联解体后，西方产生了一种一厢情愿的观念，认为俄罗斯会百花齐放，成为一个信奉自由市场的民主国家，该国的中产阶级将注重和平、产权和法治，于是西方努力与莫斯科建立“战略伙伴关系。

That effort lies at the bottom of the Black Sea, sunk by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March2014, its military intervention in eastern Ukraine and poorly conceived and executed westernpolicies in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. Now an older theory is back in fashion, which depictsan unbridgeable gap between Russian and western values. It asserts that this gap, thoughwidening under Mr Putin, must in its deepest sense be understood as a reflection ofprofoundly different historical experiences in modern Russia and the west. On the Russian side,it has stimulated a censorious, anti-western conservatism on social questions. It hassharpened a propensity to use military force against neighbours, notably Georgia and Ukraine.It is suffused with truculence towards Nato states. As a result, the west must be on its guard.

这一努力如今已沉入黑海底部，原因是俄罗斯在2014年3月吞并克里米亚，在乌克兰东部进行军事干预，以及西方对后苏联时代的俄罗斯邻近地区的政策思虑不周，执行糟糕。现在，一种更老的理论再度风行起来，该理论描绘了俄罗斯和西方价值观之间无法弥合的鸿沟。该理论断言，尽管这一鸿沟在普京任内扩大，但在最深层意义上，必须将其理解为反映了现代俄罗斯和西方之间深刻不同的历史经验。在俄罗斯这方面，这道鸿沟煽动了在社会问题上苛刻的反西方保守主义，还加强了对邻国动武的倾向，尤其是格鲁吉亚和乌克兰。这道鸿沟充斥着对北约(Nato)国家的好战姿态。因此，西方必须加以防范。

This theory has strengths and weaknesses. It rightly emphasises the importance of domesticfactors in the way that Russia formulates and conducts its foreign policy. On the other hand, itrisks falling into the conceptual error of confusing an authoritarian strongman with an entiresociety, as if the wills of Mr Putin and 140m-plus Russians are one and the same.

这一理论有其长处和短处。它正确强调了国内因素对俄罗斯外交政策制定和实施的重要性。另一方面，该理论有可能落入概念性错误，将一个威权强人与整个社会混为一谈，仿佛普京的意愿就是1.4亿多俄罗斯人的意愿。

The assumption that Mr Putin is hugely popular with the Russian people — who endorse hisever more militaristic foreign policy — deserves more scrutiny than it receives from westernpolitical, academic and media circles. First, a system of government that restricts politicalcompetition and controls freedom of expression as methodically as in Russia is not a systemwhere popularity means what it does in the west.

对于认为普京在俄罗斯民间(俄罗斯人支持普京日趋军国主义的外交政策)人气极高的假设，西方政治、学术和媒体圈应该加强观察和研究。首先，在一个像俄罗斯那样系统性地限制政治竞争、控制言论自由的政体中，人气的内涵与西方是不同的。

Second, Russians are little different from everyone else in judging their rulers by how theyimprove or harm the quality of life. What mainly matters is a government’s economic andsocial record, not its foreign policy adventures, which can be exciting but tend after a while tofade in attractiveness.

第二，在以自己的生活品质得到改善还是受到损害来评判统治者方面，俄罗斯人和其他国家的人民没什么不同。真正重要的是政府的经济和社会功绩，而不是外交政策冒险，后者可能令人兴奋，但往往会在一段时间后逐渐丧失吸引力。

Russia’s economy suffers from a shrinking labour force, woeful productivity, over-dependence on natural resources, too little investment and innovation, capital flight,ubiquitous corruption and a wretched parody of the rule of law. Measures that mightminimise the impact of these deficiencies on Russian living standards are unimaginable, for theywould require less confrontation with the west and less stifling domestic political conditions.

俄罗斯经济受到多种问题的困扰：劳动力人数萎缩、生产率堪忧、过于依赖自然资源、投资和创新太少、资本外逃、腐败猖獗，以及对法治的拙劣模仿。难以想象该国会采取有望减少这些不足之处对俄罗斯人生活水平影响的措施，因为这些措施要求减少与西方的对抗，放松国内政治环境。

Since Mr Putin’s managed re-election in 2012, the president and his increasingly narrow circleof courtiers have tightened their grip on power by cracking down on internal dissent andpursuing an anti-western foreign policy. The prospects for economic reform arecorrespondingly dim, with all that implies for lower living standards and the longer-termstability of Putinism.

2012年普京借助受操控的选举再次上台后，这位总统及其越来越狭窄的亲信圈子收紧了对权力的掌控，打击内部异见，实行反西方外交政策。与此对应的是，经济改革前景暗淡，一切都意味着更低的生活水平和普京主义的更长期稳定。

Crimea’s annexation went down well with millions of Russians, even more so than the August2008 war with Georgia. In March 2014, some 58 per cent of people questioned in a Levada-Center survey (the organisation is Russia’s most reputable pollster) supported annexing partsof neighbouring countries with ethnic Russian minorities. By last March, however, this figurehad fallen to 34 per cent. Meanwhile, 64 per cent of Russians — up from 56 per cent in 2009 —opposed the use of any means, including force, to keep former Soviet republics underMoscow’s control.

俄罗斯吞并克里米亚时，数以百万计的俄罗斯人热烈拥护，甚至比2008年8月俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚动武的支持度更高。2014年3月，接受列瓦达中心(Levada-Center，俄罗斯最有声望的民意调查机构)调查的人中，约有58%的人支持吞并有俄罗斯族少数民族居住的邻国部分地区。然而到了今年3月，这一数字已降至34%。与此同时，64%的俄罗斯人——高于2009年的56%——反对使用包括武力在内的任何手段将前苏联加盟共和国置于莫斯科的控制之下。

Such surveys show that the Russian public does not blindly follow the Kremlin in all respects.Much opinion appears receptive to the western concept of international relations as a civil andcommercial sphere as much as a political and military arena. The west should encourage thisoutlook by keeping channels open to Russian society.

这些调查表明，俄罗斯公众并非在所有方面都盲目跟从克里姆林宫。许多舆论似乎能够接受西方的国际关系理念——国际关系既是政治和军事的舞台，也是民间和商业往来的领域。西方应该保持与俄罗斯社会连通的渠道畅通，以鼓励这种看法。

We must be realistic. Mr Putin and his entourage are not beholden to a freely electedlegislature or to public opinion in the manner of a western government. They have travelled sofar down the road of internal and external confrontation that it will be hard to pull back.Fixed on burnishing Russia’s global prestige, smashing their domestic critics and reaping theprivate rewards of public office, they will serve us, for the time being, the same drearypropaganda diet about a hostile, degenerate west and its fifth columnist stooges.

我们必须现实一些。普京和他的亲信们不像西方政府那样，受到自由选举产生的议会或公众舆论的问责。他们在对内和对外对峙的道路上已经走得很远，难以收回。他们念念不忘提高俄罗斯的国际威望、打击国内批评者、以公权谋私利，因此就眼下而言，他们将继续给世人端上令人厌恶的老调宣传“大餐——有关一个敌对的、堕落的西方及其“第五纵队走狗。

Western governments must persist with a mix of firmness, unity of purpose towards Moscowand a long-term effort to make a successful state of Ukraine. They should avoid playing into MrPutin’s hands by interpreting today’s troubles with Russia as evidence of some mortal contestbetween rival models of civilisation.

西方各国政府必须坚持对莫斯科态度坚定，目标一致，同时付出长期努力将乌克兰打造成一个成功国家。它们应该避免落入普京的圈套，将当下与俄罗斯的不和解读为对立文明模式之间的殊死较量。

Moscow and the west are at odds not because they are two irreconcilable value systems andtypes of people, but mainly because an unusually malignant power apparatus controls theKremlin. The west must be patient and keep its political antennas alert for the day — remoteas it may seem while Mr Putin is in power — when Russia’s evolving internal conditions createthe space to reduce international tensions.

莫斯科与西方不和，不是因为它们是两种无法调和的价值体系或人群，而主要是因为一个异常恶劣的权力机构把持着克里姆林宫。西方必须有耐心，为俄罗斯内部状况变化带来减轻国际紧张的空间的这一天的到来保持政治警觉——尽管在普京当政期间，这一天或许看起来还很遥远。