岛国闲事:安倍劫老济少

One objection to “Abenomics”, the reflationary creed adopted by Japan’s new government, is that it will erode hard-earned savings. Instead of simply grabbing them over the weekend – as has become fashionable in certain parts of Europe – the government hopes to siphon them off gradually through gentle inflation. 对“安倍经济学”（Abenomics，日本新政府采取的通货再膨胀信条）的一种反驳观点就是，它将侵蚀人们勤苦攒下的储蓄。与欧洲一些地方已经比较流行的在一夜之间攫取人们储蓄的做法不同，日本政府希望逐渐通过缓和的通胀来“吸走”人们的储蓄。 This is a dastardly plan. It is unlikely to prove popular with the over-60s, who make up a quarter of Japan’s population, but who control two-thirds of its vast household assets. It is a good idea all the same. 这是一个残忍的计划，它不太可能会受到60岁以上的人的欢迎，这些人占日本人口的四分之一，却掌控着日本家庭资产的三分之二。但这依然是个好主意。 The reason for welcoming this intergenerational theft is that, for 20 years, Japan has prioritised the interests of older generations over younger ones. That is not only unfair. Penalising youth is also not the best way to build a nation’s future. Taxing the old through inflation is one way to redress what has been a long squeeze of one generation by another. 赞成这种代际“盗窃”的理由是，20年来，日本一直注重的是年长一代的利益，而不是年轻一代。这不仅不公平，而且损害年轻人的利益也不是塑造一个国家未来的最好方式。通过通胀向年老一代征税，是纠正长期以来一代人“压榨”另一代人的一种方式。 Most of the squeezing has taken place in the workplace. The pre-bubble generation, those who got jobs before the 1990 asset-price crash, had a fairly straightforward path to prosperity. After negotiating “exam hell”, they proceeded to good universities and from there to big companies that would recruit them straight after graduation. In return for life-long loyalty, employees would be given a job until retirement with ascending seniority and pay. 大部分的“压榨”都发生在工作场所。泡沫之前的一代人，也就是那些在上世纪90年代资产价格崩溃之前获得工作的人，有一条通往富裕的直接道路。在经历了“考试地狱”之后，他们进入好的大学，毕业之后直接获得大企业的聘用。作为终生忠诚的回报，员工在退休之前都有工作保障，并且职位和薪资也在不断上升。 This happy system was not for everyone. Even in the fast-growth decades, the lifetime employment model only covered about 30-40 per cent of employees. But its creed spread further than that. In 1990, just one in five employees was classified as non-permanent. 但并不是每个人都能享受这种幸福体系。即使是在快速增长的那几十年，终生就业模式也只是覆盖到30%到40%的员工。但持有这样信条的人却远远超过这一比例。1990年，只有五分之一的就业者被认为是非永久性的。 That all changed when the bubble burst. As companies paid back debts and slowly reined in expenses to match reduced revenue prospects, they cut costs. Naturally, there were some lay-offs. But in Japan, far fewer workers lost their jobs than in societies with more flexible labour laws and less sense of loyalty to existing employees. 泡沫破灭的时候，所有的一切都发生了变化。公司既要偿还债务，又要因为未来收入下降的前景缓慢控制开销，因此它们会削减成本。很自然就会出现一些裁员。但相比有着更灵活劳动法和对现有员工忠诚感较低的社会，日本失业的工人较少。 Thus those who bore the brunt of restructuring were Japan’s youth, who were simply not hired by big companies but shunted into casual work. As a result, about 35 per cent of workers are now casual or part time. Such jobs are held overwhelmingly by younger workers and women. Youth unemployment is more than twice the national average at about 10 per cent. 因此受到重组影响的首当其冲的就是日本的年轻人，他们没有被大公司雇佣，而是从事临时工作。因此，目前大约有35%的人是临时工人或者从事兼职。从事这种工作的人绝大多数都是年轻人和女性。因而年轻人的失业率大约为10%，是全国平均水平的两倍以上。 Dimmer employment prospects for young people have not been the only problem. Younger workers have been expected to contribute more than today’s retirees to the state pension. To add insult to injury this will pay out less. Many younger people have opted out altogether. Having taken a look at Japan’s finances – chronic fiscal deficits and gross public debt at 230 per cent of output – they have concluded there may be no payout at all when they retire. 年轻人面临的问题不仅是黯淡的就业前景。一直以来年轻的就业人员对国家养老金的贡献都要多于现在的退休人员。更糟糕的是，未来他们得到的会更少。于是很多年轻人干脆选择退出。看看日本的财政状况——长期财政赤字，公共债务总额高达国内生产总值(GDP)的230%——他们认为等到他们退休的时候，或许根本就拿不到养老金。 Deflation has been the main culprit in Japan’s 20-year economic drama. But, ironically, it has also been the saviour. Part-time workers may get miserable wages, but that is not so bad when prices are back at 1990 levels. Interest rates on savings are derisory but they provide a positive return when measured against falling prices. The government too may have a huge debt but it is easily serviced when 10-year Japanese government bonds yield less than 1 per cent. 日本20年的经济低迷中，通货紧缩一直都是罪魁祸首。具有讽刺意味的是，它也是一个救星。兼职工作者的工资或许很低，但如果物价回到上世纪90年代的水平，也还是能够过得去的。尽管储蓄利率低得让人嗤之以鼻，但考虑到物价下降，储蓄的回报还是正的。日本政府或许背负着沉重的债务，但当10年期国债收益率低于1%的时候，履债还是比较轻松的。 Japan’s households own about $12tn of net assets, a little less than the government’s gross debt, and considerably more than its net debt. Since more than 90 per cent of public debt is owned by Japanese, the problem is more about distribution of pain than risk of default. One way of looking at Japan’s debt is as deferred tax. Instead of paying tax, Japanese savers have lent money to the government so that it can spend more than it can raise in (deflationary suppressed) revenue. 日本家庭大约拥有12万亿美元的净资产，略低于政府总债务，但却远远高于其净债务。由于90%以上的公共债务都是由日本人民持有，因此问题与其说在于债务违约的风险，还不如说在于债务之痛的分配。可以将日本债务看作递延税。日本储蓄者不是以纳税的方式，而是以借钱给政府的方式，使得政府的支出能够高于（被通缩抑制的）收入。 Now the government could tax workers directly through higher income tax or indirectly through higher corporate tax. But that seems unfair since younger people have already paid a price through reduced opportunity and earnings potential. 现在政府可以通过更高的所得税直接向工人征税，或者是通过更高的企业税间接征税。但这看起来是不公平的，因为年轻人已经因为就业机会和潜在收入的减少而付出了代价。 Alternatively, the government could tax those who accumulated wealth in the good years. Inflation is one way of doing that. So is inheritance tax. And indeed, the government plans to raise estate tax from 50 per cent to 55 per cent. 或者，政府也可以向那些在繁荣时期积累了财富的人征税。通货膨胀就是一种方式，遗产税也是。实际上，政府正在计划将房地产遗产税从50%提高到55%。 The intergenerational conflict is not as stark as the above analysis makes it sound. In practice, younger people with less well-paid jobs often live with their parents. There is even a term for it – parasite singles. Grandparents indulge their grandchildren by running down their savings to pay for luxuries or education, a pattern now being encouraged with tax exemptions on some intergenerational transfers. 代际冲突并没有上述分析让人感觉的那么激烈。实际上，收入不高的年轻人通常与父母生活在一起。甚至还有一个专门的词来描述他们：“单身寄生族”(parasite singles)。祖父母会倾其储蓄为孙辈购买奢侈品或者是支付教育费用，现在的一些代际转移支付免税措施就鼓励这种模式。 Generational rebalancing can go too far. Taro Aso, the 72-year-old finance minister, recently joked that old people should “hurry up and die” so that they did not drain the public purse. Such horrible insensitivity aside, robbing retirees to pay for the next generation is no panacea. 代际再平衡可能会走极端。72岁的日本财务大臣麻生太郎(Taro Aso)最近开玩笑说，老年人应该“赶紧去世”，这样他们就不会挤占公共资金。且不说其冷漠无情，抢劫退休人员为下一代省钱也并不是万灵药。 More must be done, too, to shift money from cash-hoarding companies to cash-hungry households. Productivity must also be raised. Indeed, Prime minister Shinzo Abe’s plans could come unstuck if wages – stagnant or falling for years – fail to keep pace with hoped-for inflation. 必须采取更多行动，将钱从囤积资金的公司转移到缺乏资金的家庭。同时还必须提高生产力。实际上，如果数年来一直停滞不前甚至是在下降的工资没能跟得上预期通胀，那么安倍首相的计划可能就会失效。 Still, part of the point of moving from deflation to inflation is to help tomorrow’s earners and wealth creators. If Japan’s savers have to lose a little in the process, so be it. 而且，从通货紧缩转向通货膨胀的部分意义在于，帮助未来的工薪阶层和财富创造者。如果在这个过程中，日本的储蓄者必须有一点损失，那也只能如此。