叙利亚的真正考验

The proposition tested by the Arab uprisings was never really whether democracy’s moment had come in the Middle East. It was whether Arab dictators could continue to oppress, torture and kill their citizens to keep power.

阿拉伯世界起义所考验的命题，从来不是民主的时机是否已经来到中东，而是阿拉伯的独裁者能否继续为了掌权而压迫、折磨和杀戮本国公民。

These used to be the standard tactics for the region’s despots. But the case can be made that Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Muammer Gaddafi of Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and now, perhaps, Bashar al-Assad in Syria all sealed their fate when they turned their forces against their own citizens.

压迫、折磨和杀戮曾是该地区专制者的标准策略。但是，当突尼斯的扎因·阿比丁·本·阿里(Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali)、利比亚的穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)、埃及的胡斯尼·穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)以及现在可能还有叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)让军队把枪口对准国内人民时，他们全部决定了自己的命运。

Of course, progress has hardly been uniform and may be reversible. But the upheavals have at least created the opportunity to advance a new regional principle: that a leader who threatens his own people risks losing the legitimacy to govern.

当然，进展并非一刀齐，甚至还可能发生逆转。但这些剧变至少为倡导一项新的区域原则创造了机会：领导者如果威胁本国人民，就有可能失去统治的合法性。

Nowhere in the region has this proposition been more tested than in Syria. For as long as Mr Assad’s regime held on to power – using the same techniques his father employed – the lesson was that tyranny pays. Now that his hold appears finally to be slipping, the authority of that lesson is dealt a serious blow.

叙利亚对该命题的考验程度超出了该地区其它国家，因为只要阿萨德政权继续掌权（采取其父当年使用的方法），结论就是实施暴政有好处。随着他对局势的掌控似乎终于开始减弱，这一结论的权威性受到沉重打击。

It may, however, not be a decisive one. If Syria disintegrates into sectarian war; if Sunnis take revenge on Alawites; if all that changes is the identity of the oppressor, not the nature of the oppression; the savage tools of the past will retain their appeal. Dictators and extremists may conclude that the only mistake Mr Mubarak or Mr Assad made was not to be brutal enough. While the moral and strategic case for Mr Assad’s departure is compelling, it remains to be seen whether this would bring more or less security in the near term. The belief is that the regime’s fall would be a serious setback for Iran and Hezbollah and a net gain for more moderate (or pragmatic) forces. But when it comes to realpolitik, this conclusion may be temporary.

不过，这种打击可能还不够决定性。如果叙利亚分裂，陷入教派战争；如果逊尼派(Sunnis)报复阿拉维派教徒(Alawites)；如果一切的变化只是换了压迫者，而非压迫的本质，那么昔日的残暴工具将保留其吸引力。独裁者和极端分子可能得出结论：穆巴拉克或阿萨德犯下的唯一错误是不够残暴。尽管要求阿萨德下台的道德和战略理由是有说服力的，但这在近期内能够增强还是削弱安全仍是未知数。人们的信念是，阿萨德政权倒台将使伊朗和真主党(Hezbollah)受到重挫，而对更加温和（或者说务实）的势力则在总体上是有利的。但放在现实政治中，这一结论可能只是暂时的。

Sectarian warfare and chaos bring their own problems. The spectre of Mr Assad’s non-conventional arsenal falling into extremist hands is a frightening one. Syria’s fracture could produce the kind of volatility across Syria’s borders that Israel has experienced across the Lebanese one. Iran could prove more adept at exerting its influence, and protecting its links with Hezbollah, in a Syria torn by sectarian strife, than many are yet willing to concede. And who can know what threat the forces that emerge in Damascus may pose to regional stability?

教派战争和混乱本身会产生问题。阿萨德的非常规武器库落入极端分子之手的可怕前景令人不寒而栗。叙利亚分裂可能引发动荡，产生超出该国边界的冲击波，就像以色列感受到黎巴嫩境内的动荡一样。在一个被教派冲突撕裂的叙利亚，伊朗在施加影响并保护其与真主党的联系方面，可能比很多人所愿意承认的更加拿手。再说，谁能知道在大马士革脱颖而出的力量，将对地区稳定构成什么样的威胁？

For all the importance of removing the brutal Assad regime, the risks associated with its demise are significant and must be mitigated. His removal, for example, should probably not include the wholesale dismissal of state officials or the dismantling of state institutions, allowing for the kind of chaos the de-Ba’athification of Iraq produced. Similarly, decisively weakening Iran will be important to limit its reach into a post-Assad Syria. Also crucial are efforts to build an inclusive constitutional and governing structure that might hold Syria together and prevent retaliation against Alawite communities or cross-border provocations.

尽管推翻残暴的阿萨德政权很重要，但其政权灭亡所伴随的风险也是显著的，必须得到减缓。例如，阿萨德倒台不应包括解雇所有政府官员或者废除国家机关，引发类似伊拉克去复兴党化(de-Ba’athification)那样的混乱。同样，果断地削弱伊朗，对于限制其把触角伸向后阿萨德时代的叙利亚将是重要的。同样关键的是，努力构建一套包容的机构和治理架构，维护叙利亚统一，防止针对阿拉维派社区的报复或者跨境挑衅。

These measures and others are vital to ensure a smoother transition to a post-Assad Syria, but they are also important for the region. Proving the oppression of one’s fellow citizens to be a bad idea would be a critical development by Middle Eastern standards. Good governance begins with a commitment to the inalienable rights and basic humanity of the governed. If the example of Mr Assad’s fall, and of the Arab uprisings, can help strengthen this commitment among ruling elites, even out of self-interest, it will be a real advance. If those who oust a dictator know that only by good governance and respect for their citizens can they retain power and earn international legitimacy, the Middle East will be moving in a better direction. It may not yet be democracy, but it is an indispensable milestone on the path to it.

这些措施以及其他一些措施，对于保证叙利亚更加平稳地向后阿萨德时代过渡是至关重要的，它们对整个地区也很重要。证明压迫国内人民是个馊主意，按中东标准将是一个关键进展。良好的治理始于对被统治者不可剥夺的权利和基本人道的承诺。如果阿萨德倒台乃至阿拉伯起义的例子能够加强统治精英的这一承诺（即便是出于私利），那就是一项重大进步。如果那些把独裁者赶下台的人明白，只有治理良好、尊重人民才能保住权力、在国际上获得合法性，那么中东将走上更加美好的道路。这或许还算不上民主，但这是走向民主道路上一块不可或缺的里程碑。

All revolutions against dictatorial regimes are, at some level, about the transfer of fear. Populations afraid of regimes shift to regimes afraid of populations. The true test of progress, however, is whether the revolution undermines the use of fear as a tool of governance. This is the real test in Syria. It does not end with the removal of the Assad regime – it begins there. The hope for a patient transition to greater democracy in the Middle East may well hinge on passing it.

一切反对独裁政权的革命，其关键在某种程度上都是“恐惧的转移：由人民害怕政权转移到政权害怕人民。不过，对进步的真正考验是，革命能否遏制把恐惧用作一种治理工具的做法。这是叙利亚面临的真实考验。这种考验不会随着推翻阿萨德政权而结束，而是会随着这件事的发生而开始。耐心等待中东地区实现更大民主的希望，很可能取决于经受住这场考验。

The writer is an international associate at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He advised Israel’s foreign minister from 2006 to 2010

本文作者是华盛顿近东政策研究所(Washington Institute for Near East Policy)国际研究员。他曾于2006-2010年为以色列外交部长提供咨询