央行独立时代即将结束

Whether they like it or not, central bankers are being dragged into the political fray. It is not so much an issue of whether independence is good or bad. Rather, monetary policy itself is no longer a job for technocrats.

不管主观上是否喜欢，各国央行行长目前已经被动卷入了政治纷争。央行政策独立性本身是好还是坏，这个问题已不是那么重要了。如今的问题已变成，制定货币政策本身不再是技术官僚的工作了。

Pre-crisis, it was assumed the achievement of price stability would keep everybody happy. Yes, central bankers would have to nudge interest rates in one direction or the other, making some of us better off and others worse off. Across an economic cycle, however, these effects would even out. In that sense, monetary policy could be regarded as politically neutral.

金融危机爆发前，各国央行的想法是，实现价格稳定就能保证各方满意。诚然，各国央行行长们必须有时调高利率，有时调低利率，每次的利率调整都将使一部分人受益，使另一部分人利益受损。然而，从整个经济周期的跨度内来看，这些调整所产生的影响将互相抵消。从这个意义上来说，货币政策在政治上可以视为是中性的。

No longer. Since the recession, developed world economies have stagnated and central bankers have had little choice but to keep rates close to zero and to pursue increasingly unconventional monetary policies in the hope that they will trigger a robust recovery.

但情况已经发生了变化。自经济开始衰退以来，发达世界各经济体经济一直停滞不前，各国央行行长几乎别无选择，只能将利率维持在接近于零的水平，推出的货币政策也越来越非常规，希望能够借此推动经济开始强劲复苏。

Monetary policy today carries big political connotations. In the UK, for example, the most obvious sign is the Bank of England’s willingness to tolerate a rate of inflation far above the target set by parliament. While there is a reasonable justification – far better, surely, to squeeze all workers’ wages in real terms than to have a Depression-style rise in unemployment – it is not at all obvious that it is a decision to be made by the high priests of the central banking community alone.

如今的货币政策具有浓重的政治意味。以英国为例，最明显的信号是，英国央行(Bank of England)愿意容忍远高于英国议会所设上限的通胀率。对此存在合理解释，即：压低全体工人的实际工资，无疑远好过使社会整体失业率出现类似大萧条时期的显著上升。尽管如此，提高对通胀的容忍度显然不是英国央行高层能够决定的事情。

There are less obvious effects that also warrant greater scrutiny. Quantitative easing may make it easier for governments to raise funds cheaply; but, by increasing the net present value of pension funds’ future liabilities, it creates problems for funds already running deficits. That, in turn, means either bigger pension contributions for workers; lower prospective pension benefits; or, in the case of some public sector pensions, tax increases or spending cuts to make the numbers add up. Meanwhile, some of the biggest beneficiaries of QE are those already asset-rich and relatively old who prefer to sit on their windfall gains rather than spend them.

货币政策的其他一些效果更加隐蔽，但对其也应仔细考量。量化宽松或使政府能够更容易地以较低成本筹措资金，但此举将使养老基金未来负债的净现值增大，导致已然入不敷出的基金出现问题。而这将反过来导致职工的养老金缴纳金额增加，并使未来的养老金支付水平下降，抑或，对某些公共部门养老基金而言，这也可能导致这些基金通过增税或减支实现收支平衡。此外，量化宽松的最大受益者中有一些是资产雄厚的年长人士，他们更倾向于把这笔意外之财存起来、而非花掉。

Put another way, monetary policy is doing more to redistribute income and wealth than to trigger a rebound in economic activity. Central bankers are making decisions that are more political than economic.

换句话说，货币政策在收入和财富的再分配方面的作用，强于对经济活动复苏的刺激作用。央行行长们目前所做决策的政治意味比经济意味更浓。

So it should come as no surprise that central bank independence is under threat. Nowhere is this more obvious than in Japan, where Shinzo Abe’s new government is planning both to appoint a new Bank of Japan governor and to refine the bank’s price stability mandate. The BoJ is likely to find itself under pressure to hit an inflation rate of 2 per cent rather than the current 1 per cent objective, bringing it into line with central banks elsewhere.

因此，中央银行的独立性受到威胁也就不足为奇了。这一趋势在日本表现得尤为明显。安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)领导的新政府计划任命一位新的日本央行(Bank of Japan)行长，并修订日本央行在维持物价稳定方面的政策目标。日本央行很可能迫于压力、将通胀政策目标从现在的1%调高为2%，从而与其他央行看齐。

It seems a reasonable ambition. But announcing an ambition does not necessarily imply it will be met. Supporters of struggling Aston Villa, for example, surely hope their team will one day win the English Premier League. On current form, however, the chances seem remote. Likewise, even if the BoJ hoped to hit a 2 per cent target, would it have the tools to do so?

将通胀目标水平设为2%看似合理。但公开宣布这一政策目标，并不意味着该目标一定能够实现。比如说，阿斯顿维拉(Aston Villa)足球俱乐部虽然处境艰难，但其支持者当然希望有朝一日他们的球队能够在英超联赛(English Premier League)中夺冠。然而，从目前的情况来看，这只球队夺冠的希望非常渺茫。同理，即使日本央行宣布希望将通胀率保持在2%，该行是否具备实现这一目标的政策工具则是另外一回事。

Imagine it does not. The obvious thing would be to send for the monetary helicopters, namely a big increase in the budget deficit to be funded through sales of newly issued government bonds to the central bank. At that point, the bank’s politicisation would be more or less complete: it would be no more than an agency of government.

假设日本央行不具备相关政策工具。最直接的办法将是开动印钞机多印钞票，即显著扩大预算赤字规模，并通过向中央银行出售新发行的政府债券为赤字融资。届时，中央银行的政治化就将基本完成：中央银行将沦为政府的一个下属机构。

We cannot possibly know how the Japanese public would behave under those circumstances. Would they view a helicopter drop as a logical extension of unconventional policies, leading to a modest rise in inflation? Or would they take the view that the BoJ was now a passive agent of fiscal policy, no longer able to offer monetary discipline? If so, it surely would not be long before they dumped their yen, triggering a shift from excessively low to excessively high inflation.

我们无法预知日本公众在这种情况下会做出怎样的反应。他们是否会接受可能致通胀水平温和上升的印钞行为，并将其看做是非常规政策的合理延伸？抑或，他们会不会认为，日本央行已沦为被动服务于财政政策的机构，不再具备维持货币纪律的能力？若果真如此，则不需多时，日本民众就将抛售手中的日元，导致日本的通货膨胀率从极低的水平升至过高的水平。

I know it is hard to imagine, particularly in a country dogged by deflation. But following two decades of central bank independence, we have to face facts. They can no longer be properly “independent because their policies are creating both winners and losers. They are making decisions that are inherently political. Once politicians recognise this they will surely be tempted to take over the reins. At that point, monetary stability, for good or bad, can no longer be guaranteed.

我知道这是一种难以想象的情形，特别是对长期为通缩所困扰的日本而言。但在央行保持了二十年的独立之后，如今我们必须面对现实。央行已经不适合保持“独立，因为央行颁布的政策在使一部分人受益的同时也使另一部分人蒙受损失。央行所做的决策，从内在属性而言就带有政治色彩。一旦政界意识到这一点，他们必将想要夺走央行的决策权。到那时，货币政策稳定性（无论是好是坏）将失去保证。

The writer is HSBC Group chief economist and global head of economics?and?asset?allocation research

本文作者为汇丰集团(HSBC Group)首席经济学家、该行经济学及资产配置研究全球负责人