欧洲央行救得了欧元吗？

Last week’s decision by the European Central Bank to make unlimited purchases of government bonds in secondary markets was both necessary and bold. Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president, deserves credit for having obtained agreement for this controversial step, against the sole, albeit significant, opposition of Jens Weidmann, president of Germany’s redoubtable Bundesbank. It is a pity that the ECB did not do this before the crisis in sovereign debt reached Spain and Italy. Yet this delay is not surprising: eurozone policy makers have, perhaps inevitably, done too little, too late.

欧洲央行(ECB)在二级市场无限制购买政府债券的决定，既必要又大胆。欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)顶住德国令人敬畏的央行(Bundesbank)行长延斯·魏德曼(Jens Weidmann)孤立（尽管重要）的反对，推动各方就这个有争议的步骤达成一致，此举值得赞赏。可惜欧洲央行没有在主权债务危机波及西班牙和意大利之前采取这项行动，但拖延并不意外：欧元区政策制定者总是做得太少、太迟，这也许是不可避免的。

It is not the ECB’s fault that this action is too little. Its aim is to eliminate the risk of a eurozone breakup forced by the markets. But it cannot achieve this on its own. Ensuring the survival of the eurozone is a political decision. The ECB can only influence, not determine, the outcome.

做得不够并非欧洲央行之过。它意图消除市场带来的欧元区解体风险，却无法独自实现目标。确保欧元区的生存是一项政治决策，欧洲央行只能影响结果，但不能决定结果。

The rationale offered for the programme of “Outright Monetary Transactions is ingenious. The ECB insists that it does not aim to finance governments in difficulty. That, it insists, is a mere byproduct. At last week’s press conference, Mr Draghi stated that: “We aim to preserve the singleness of our monetary policy and to ensure the proper transmission of our policy stance to the real economy throughout the area. OMTs will enable us to address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro. In making this case, Mr Draghi argued that “you have large parts of the euro area in what we call a ‘bad equilibrium’ . . . So, there is a case for intervening . . . to “break these expectations, which. . . do not concern only the specific countries, but the euro area as a whole. And this would justify the intervention of the central bank. This then marks belated acceptance of strong arguments made by the Belgian economist, Paul de Grauwe, at the London School of Economics.

直接货币交易(Outright Monetary Transactions, OMT)的逻辑十分巧妙。欧洲央行坚称其目的不是为处于困境的政府融资，称这种效果只是一项副产品。在上周的资讯发布会上，德拉吉称：“我们意图维护货币政策的单一性，确保我们的政策立场妥善传递到整个欧元区的实体经济。OMT将使我们能够应对国债市场的严重扭曲，而这种扭曲的主要来源是投资者对欧元可逆性的无端恐慌。德拉吉在论证时提出：“欧元区有很大一部分被我们称为‘不良均衡’的地区……因此，我们有理由干预……来‘击破’这些预期……这不仅关系到几个特定国家，还关系到整个欧元区。而这将为央行干预提供依据。此番言论显示，伦敦经济学院(London School of Economics)比利时经济学家保罗·德·格劳威(Paul de Grauwe)的有力论点终于得到迟来的认可。

In its “Article IV consultation with the eurozone, published in July, the staff of the International Monetary Fund argues that despite the low policy rates, credit conditions are extremely tight in some member countries. This, it argues, is due to divergent perceptions of the interlinked sovereign and banking risks, as well as a shrinkage in cross-border lending, as efforts are made to increase capital and liquidity buffers at home and place overnight deposits at the ECB. Today, in consequence, “financing conditions are the least supportive in countries where the crisis is the most acute. This dire situation gives a strong rationale for the new policy. (See charts.)

在7月公布的与欧元区“第四条(Article IV)磋商中，国际货币基金组织(IMF)员工认为，尽管政策利率较低，但部分欧元区成员国的信贷环境仍然极为紧张。IMF认为，这是因为各方对互相关联的主权和银行业风险存在认识分歧，以及跨境放贷缩减（原因是各机构忙于增加国内资本和流动性缓冲，并将隔夜存款放在欧洲央行）。结果是如今“危机最紧迫国家的融资环境最缺乏支持。这种糟糕状况为出台新政策提供了有力依据。

Yet the ECB will not intervene unconditionally. It will, instead, intervene if and only if countries meet specific conditions. The precise conditions will not be set by the ECB. Mr Draghi said that it was up to the governments, the EU, the European Commission and the IMF to decide on the precise nature of these conditions. But, once agreed, they would need to be respected. That is the ECB’s demand.

不过，欧洲央行不会无条件介入，而是只有在相关国家满足特定条件时才会介入。具体条件并非由欧洲央行设定。德拉吉说，这些条件的具体性质将由各国政府、欧盟、欧盟委员会和IMF决定。但欧洲央行要求，一旦达成一致，这些条件需要得到尊重。

Such conditionality is perfectly understandable. But it must militate against the goals of the new programme. The ECB is saying that it will seek to eliminate the threat of a break-up, except when this threat is most real, which is. of course, precisely when the country is failing to meet policy conditions. Investors know that electorates might choose a government that has no intention of sticking to agreed conditions. What happens then? The answer is: either the ECB stops buying, in which case the bond market implodes, or the ECB continues, in which case conditionality is jettisoned.

这种条件性完全可以理解，却必然会妨碍新计划实现目标。欧洲央行宣称将试图消除解体的威胁，但威胁最迫切的时候（恰恰是相关国家满足不了政策条件的时候）除外。投资者明白，选民可能会选择无意遵守约定条件的政府。然后会怎么样？答案是：欧洲央行要么停止购买计划，放任债券市场崩溃；要么放弃条件，继续购债。

This latter possibility seems the more likely: it will be hard for the ECB to stop. But that, too, might have dire consequences. Spurred on by opposition to this scheme from the Bundesbank, postwar Germany’s most respected institution, swathes of German opinion hate what is happening to their money, as my colleague, Wolfgang Munchau, explained in a recent column. It is easy to imagine what would happen within Germany if an important member country started to backslide on agreed policy conditions, while the ECB went on buying its bonds. The swelling rage would hardly strengthen confidence in the irreversibility of the euro. Nobody could be sure how German politicians would choose to respond – or be allowed to respond. At present, the government is quite supportive of the ECB. But that would surely not endure under all circumstances.

后一种似乎可能性较大，因为欧洲央行很难停下脚步。但这同样可能产生糟糕后果。正如我的同事沃尔夫冈·明肖(Wolfgang Münchau)在最近一篇专栏中所说，在德国战后最受尊敬的机构德国央行反对无限制购债计划的带动下，德国舆论对该国资金流向普遍反感。不难想象，如果一个重要成员国开始违反约定的政策条件，而欧洲央行继续购买该国债券，那么在德国国内会发生什么。冲天的怒气不会加强人们对欧元不可逆性的信心。没人能够确定德国政界人士将选择如何回应，或者被允许如何回应。目前德国政府相当支持欧洲央行，但这种支持肯定不是在任何情况下都能维系的。

In brief, a conditional programme of bond purchases, implemented against the opposition of the Bundesbank, just cannot make the eurozone credibly irreversible.

简言之，在德国央行反对的情况下实施的有条件债券购买计划，无法可信地保证欧元区的不可逆性。

Is there any way the ECB on its own could make it more credible that the eurozone will last?

欧洲央行有没有办法凭借一己之力，让欧元区的生存前景更加可信？

The answer is: yes and no.

答案是：有和没有。

Yes, if people believed membership of the eurozone were clearly in everyone’s interests, its survival would become far more credible. For that to happen, deficit countries need growth and jobs. The ECB could contribute by stepping harder on the monetary accelerator. After all, short-term economic prospects are dismal: the ECB forecasts real economic growth in the eurozone at -0.6 per cent to -0.2 per cent this year and -0.4 – 1.4 per cent in 2013. By the second quarter of 2012, eurozone nominal gross domestic product was a mere 3.4 per cent higher than in the first quarter of 2010.

有。如果人们认为留在欧元区明显符合所有人的利益，那么欧元区生存下去的可信度将大大提高。要实现这一点，赤字国需要增长和就业。欧洲央行可以通过更重地踩下货币政策油门来作出贡献。毕竟，短期经济前景依然黯淡：欧洲央行预测今年欧元区实体经济增长率在-0.6%至-0.2%之间，而2013年是-0.4%至1.4%之间。截至2012年第二季度，欧元区名义国内生产总值(GDP)仅比2010年第一季度高3.4%。

Yet the answer is also, alas, no, because a more aggressive monetary policy would confirm German fears that the ECB was becoming the Banca d’Italia. The difficulty for the ECB is that relevant and appropriate measures are viewed, in Germany, as a giant step on the dismal path to hyperinflationary ruin. So long as this is the case, the ECB cannot make the euro look irreversible. That fact will undermine markets. That would force the ECB to buy more, so making the policy still less credible.

但不幸的是，答案也是“没有。更加激进的货币政策将印证德国的担忧，即欧洲央行正成为意大利央行(Banca d’Italia)。欧洲央行的困难在于，相关和适当的措施在德国被视为朝着严重通胀的废墟迈出一大步。只要这种情况没有改变，欧洲央行就无法让欧元看上去具有不可逆性。这个事实将挫伤市场底气。那将迫使欧洲央行买入更多债券，从而进一步削弱政策的可信度。

The ECB has done what it can, given the politics. The decision of the German constitutional court and the result of the Dutch election may help. But the risks of a breakup cannot be eliminated. If these are to disappear, citizens of debtor countries must see a credible path to growth, while citizens of creditor countries must believe they are not throwing money down a bottomless pit. What the ECB has done is win some time. It has not won the game.

考虑到政治状况，欧洲央行已经是尽力了。德国宪法法院的裁决和荷兰大选结果可能会带来帮助，但解体风险难以消除。如要消除风险，债务国的公民必须找到可信的增长途径，而债权国的公民必须相信他们没有把钱扔进无底洞。欧洲央行的举措赢得了时间，但还没有赢得这场游戏。