中日之争与英阿冲突的异同

The situation feels familiar. The casus belli is a little-known group of islands. The country in possession is perceived, not least by itself, as being in long-term economic decline. The claimant considers the islands to be a symbol of national humiliation stretching back into the 19th century.

现在的局势有种似曾相识的感觉。争端的导火索是一群鲜为人知的岛屿。在外界眼中，控制岛屿的一国正身陷长期经济衰退——重要的是，该国自己也这么认为。而声称对这些岛屿拥有主权的一国，则认为这些岛屿是可追溯至19世纪的国耻的象征。

Like Argentina in 1982, China is ruled by an unelected cabal at the apex of an organisation designed for a bygone era. Like Britain,Japan is an ally of the US and unsure how much support to expect from its superpower friend.

像1982年的阿根廷一样，中国也是由一个非民选的小集团统治的，这个小集团统率着一个宗旨已然过时的组织。日本则像当时的英国一样，是美国的盟友，但不确定能从这个超级大国盟友那里获得多大支持。

There are clear differences too. Even at its 1970s low point, Britain’s economy was much larger than Argentina’s, whereas China has recently displaced Japan as the world’s second-biggest economy. Moreover, Japan’s armed forces have not fired a shot in anger in 60 years and the defence budget has rarely topped 1 per cent of output. China is a nuclear power with military expenditure at least double Japan’s.

不过，彼时和此时也有明显区别。即便是在20世纪70年代的低谷期，英国的经济产出也比阿根廷大得多。而中国近年来已超越日本，成为世界第二大经济体。此外，日本的武装力量已有60年未开过一枪，国防预算很少超过经济产出的1%。中国则是核大国，军费开支至少是日本的两倍。

Unlike Britain and Argentina, China and Japan are not at opposite ends of the earth. They are neighbours, with a thriving trade. That means there is more at stake – making it less likely that the face-off could escalate into a military clash, but far more devastating if it did.

与英国和阿根廷的情况不同，中国和日本并不是分处地球的两端。中日两国是邻居，双边贸易生机勃勃。这意味着，中日之间的这场争端可能危及更多的东西。因此，双方的对峙不大可能升级为军事冲突。但若真的爆发军事冲突，后果将远比英阿战争更具毁灭性。

History is replete with examples of misjudgements leading to disaster. Before August 1914, optimists believed the burgeoning trade between Germany and Britain made war too ruinous for either side to contemplate. So the first priority must be to defuse tensions and restore a semblance of normality. But it will only be a semblance.

历史上不乏误判导致灾难的例子。1914年8月前，乐观人士曾认为，德国和英国之间贸易繁荣，两国若爆发战争后果将是灾难性的，双方都不会考虑这个选择。因此，当务之急是缓和紧张局势，恢复表面上的正常。不过，这种正常只会是表面上的。

This latest revival of an old grudge has raised too many questions about Sino-Japanese relations.

中日之间的宿怨再起波澜，让人们对两国间的关系产生了无数疑问。

Photographs of Chinese protesters holding signs reading “Exterminate the Japanese will not be forgotten quickly in Japan. Neither will the claims – made by officials in respectable Chinese media – that Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa is questionable. That is like questioning US sovereignty over Hawaii. Arson at a Panasonic (formerly Matsushita) factory was especially symbolic. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping himself visited the company’s founder and asked for help in modernising the Chinese economy. From Japan’s perspective, what the rioters torched was not just production capacity but a whole era of Deng-inspired pragmatism.

日本不会很快忘记中国抗议者举着写有“灭掉日本人的牌子的照片，也不会忘记中国官员在名声不错的媒体上质疑日本对冲绳主权的言论。这不异于在质疑美国对夏威夷的主权。松下(Panasonic)工厂遭纵火尤其具有象征意义。1978年，邓小平亲自拜访松下公司创始人，请他帮助中国经济走向现代化。从日本的视角来看，中国暴民烧掉的不仅是产能，还有由邓小平开创的整个实用主义时代。

The economic risk can be hedged over time. Much of the output of Japanese manufacturers in China is for export to developed countries. This kind of production was always likely to shift to cheaper locations once Chinese labour costs lost competitiveness. It would be no surprise if recent events – including this week’s outbreak of labour unrest at Foxconn – were to expedite the process. Indeed, Toyo Tire and Rubber, a Toyota supplier, is already reviewing its options. Onshoring is one – especially if more aggressive monetary policy were to hit the yen – but rarely can the smiles of Thailand have looked more inviting.

随着时间的推移，经济风险是可以规避掉的。日本制造商在华生产的很大一部分产品，是出口到发达国家的。一旦中国劳动力成本失去竞争力，这种生产总是可以转移到成本更低的地方。如果最近的事件（包括本周富士康(Foxconn)爆发工人骚乱）加速了这一进程，并不会有人对此感到意外。实际上，丰田汽车(Toyota)的供应商东洋橡胶工业株式会社(Toyo Tire and Rubber)已在重审其各种选择了。“回归本土便是一个选择——特别是更为激进的货币政策导致日元走低的话——但是泰国的“微笑看上去也很少像现在这样诱人。

The strategic issues run deeper. The concept of “soft power has been found seriously wanting. The success of sushi and J-pop bands in China proved no more helpful than the popularity of Boy George and Chariots of Fire were in deterring Argentine general Leopoldo Galtieri. The argument for more hard power – increased defence spending – is likely to gain traction, as will nationalist voices on the right who have been sceptical about engagement with China. The idea of playing down the Japan-US military alliance and shifting to a more “pan-Asian strategy now seems naive.

更深层次的问题是战略。人们发现，“软实力的概念很不靠谱。就像“乔治男孩(Boy George)和“烈火战车(Chariots of Fire)受到热捧不能吓阻阿根廷将军莱奥波尔多·加尔铁里(Leopoldo Galtieri)一样，寿司和日本流行音乐在中国取得的成功同样无助于化解中日争端。加强硬实力（增加国防开支）的观点很可能会赢得支持，质疑与中国展开接触的右翼民族主义声音也会在日本国内得到响应。淡化日美军事同盟、转向“泛亚战略的观点，现在看上去很幼稚。

Less clear is the impact on Japan’s standing in the world. The Falklands war is inextricably associated with Thatcherism. The economic disasters of the 1970s caused Argentina to assume Britain lacked both resources and will to recapture a remote and valueless group of islands. Likewise the gap in the economic performance of China and Japan explains China’s growing assertiveness and raises questions about US commitment to Japanese interests.

这场争端会对日本的国际地位产生什么样的冲击，则更不容易看清。福克兰群岛战争与“撒切尔主义密不可分。20世纪70年代的经济灾难使阿根廷认为，英国既没有足够的资源、也没有足够的意愿去夺回一座遥远而毫无价值的群岛。同理，中日两国经济表现的差距解释了中国为何变得日益自信，并且使人们开始怀疑美国是否致力于保护日本的利益。

The lesson for Japan is that, if it wants to avoid unsplendid isolation, it needs to break out of its long deflationary malaise and recover growth momentum. That means bold use of fiscal and monetary policy, speedier restructuring of industries suffering from chronic overcapacity and a strategy to position Tokyo as a global hub of fashion, finance and design. Who knows – if the parallel with 1980s Britain holds, Japan might yet embark on a bull market.

如果日本不想陷入黯淡的孤立之中，那么它应该汲取的经验是：必须摆脱长期通缩顽疾，恢复增长势头。这意味着要大胆运用财政政策和货币政策，加快调整饱受长期产能过剩之苦的各个产业，树立把东京定位为全球时尚、金融和设计中心的战略。如果20世纪80年代的英国确实可供借鉴，说不定日本还有可能迎来牛市。

The writer is a Tokyo-based analyst at Arcus Research

本文作者为Arcus Research驻东京分析师