我为何仍然担心欧洲的偿付能力？

Ishould have known what would happen when you post a question at the end of a column. Last week I asked how it could be, that somebody who was pessimistic about the eurozone six months ago could be optimistic today? If you always thought it was just a liquidity crisis, you should not have been worried then, and you would be right to be optimistic now. If you thought of it as a solvency crisis, as I did, you should still be worried now.

我本该知道，如果在一篇专栏文章的末尾提问会发生什么。上周，我提出了一个问题：6个月前对欧元区还是一副悲观态度的人们，怎么可能现在却变得乐观起来？如果你一直认为这只是一场流动性危机的话，那么你本不应该担心，现在乐观是正确的。如果你和我一样认为这是一场偿付危机的话，那么你现在仍然应该担心。

Several readers pointed out to me, quite rightly, that I offered only an extreme choice. What about a solvency crisis that is not inherent but caused by a liquidity squeeze – a self-perpetuating insolvency crisis? Solvency is, after all, an analytic concept. It depends on the level of debt, future growth, ability to tap private sector wealth through taxation, ability to raise funds through privatisation and, of course, future market interest rates. Reasonable people could disagree on all of these. Even Germany could be considered insolvent if you assumed a sufficiently high interest rate.

几位读者非常合理地向我指出，我提供的只是一种极端选择。如果这场偿付危机并非是固有的，而是由流动性紧缩造成的，是一场自我存续的偿付危机，又会怎么样？毕竟，偿付能力是一个分析概念。它取决于债务水平、未来增长、通过税收利用私营部门财富的能力、通过私有化融资的能力，当然还包括未来的市场利率。理性的人可能在所有这些问题上都存在不同意见。如果假设利率足够高的话，甚至连德国也可能被视为破产。

Distinguishing pure sovereign risk (minus the contingent liabilities for the financial and non-financial private sectors) from risks that have arisen purely in those sectors, my judgment on the solvency of various entities in the eurozone has been the following. In the first category, I consider Greece to be unconditionally insolvent; Italy and Portugal to be solvent – but conditional upon a return to sustained growth. I consider the sovereigns of Spain, Ireland and the rest to be fundamentally solvent – minus the banks, of course. In the second category, I consider the private and financial sectors in Spain, Portugal and Ireland to be insolvent.

将纯粹的主权风险（减去为金融和非金融私营部门承担的或有负债）与仅仅在这些部门产生的风险区分开来，我对欧元区不同实体偿付能力的判断如下。对于纯粹的主权风险，我把希腊视为无条件破产；把意大利和葡萄牙视为具有偿付能力，但条件是回归长期增长。我把西班牙、爱尔兰和其他的主权政府视为从根本上来说具有偿付能力，当然要除去银行。对于另一类风险，我把西班牙、葡萄牙和爱尔兰的私营部门和金融行业视为破产。

Once you conflate sovereign and financial sector risk, the situation becomes more complicated. My bottom line is that the national backstops have not removed, and have possibly increased, the total solvency risk in the system.

一旦你把主权风险和金融业风险混在一起，情况就会变得更为复杂。我的最终结论是，国家施以援手不但没有消除、反而可能加大了这个体系中的整体偿付风险。

Even worse, I believe the outlook for solvency has deteriorated over the past six months due to the effects of austerity on growth at a time when interest rates have hit their lower limit. The economists Dawn Holland and Jonathan Portes have pointed out one other reason why the fiscal multiplier is unusually high at the moment: everyone is pursuing austerity at the same time. We may well have crossed the line where austerity not only raised debt ratios in the short run, which is to be expected, but may end up increasing them even in the long run – so that it becomes self-defeating.

更糟糕的是，我认为，过去6个月，由于在利率触及下限之际实施紧缩对于增长的影响，偿付能力前景已经恶化。经济学家道恩·霍兰德(Dawn Holland)和乔纳森·波特斯(Jonathan Portes)指出了财政乘数目前处于不寻常高位的另一个原因：所有人在同时推行紧缩。我们很有可能越过了一个界限，使得紧缩不仅仅在短期内提升了债务比率（人们预测会如此），而且甚至可能会最终在长期内提升这一比率——这就变成了弄巧成拙。

So if you started from where I did, you cannot be optimistic. But then again, as an Irish saying goes, you might not start from here.

因此，如果你从我的观点出发，你就不可能乐观。但正如一句爱尔兰俗语所言，你可能不会从我的观点出发。

John McHale, economics professor at the National University of Ireland, Galway, has argued that official policy can restore financial health in a self-perpetuating solvency crisis, provided a number of conditions are met. He lists four. First, the liquidity support given through the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme and other mechanisms must be reliable. Second, the conditions must be reasonable. Third, the conditionality must be flexible – unanticipated shocks should not trigger fiscal adjustments in future. Fourth, the link between banking sector losses and state debt must be broken.

爱尔兰国立高威大学(National University of Ireland,Galway)经济学教授约翰·麦克黑尔(John McHale)辩称，在自我存续的偿付危机中，倘若满足若干条件，官方政策能够恢复金融健康。他列出了4个条件。首先，通过欧洲央行(ECB)的直接货币交易(Outright Monetary Transactions，简称OMT)计划及其他机制提供的流动性支持必须可靠。其次，提供支持的条件必须合理。第三，条件限制必须灵活，意料之外的冲击不应引发未来的财政调整。第四，银行业亏损和政府债务之间的联系应被打破。

I concede that these conditions, especially the fourth, could restore solvency everywhere except in Greece. The problem is that they stand in contrast to official policy. The ECB has only announced the OMT programme. So far, nobody has made an application. The Spanish prime minister is still playing hard to get and I doubt he will make an application this year. The OMT may end up as a phantom. As in Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale – I am writing this column from Denmark – it may not be very long until some child in the bond markets points out that Mario Draghi has no clothes.

我承认，这些条件（特别是第4个）可能会恢复除希腊之外所有国家的偿付能力。问题是它们与官方政策形成对立。欧洲央行只是宣布了OMT计划。迄今为止，没有国家提出申请。西班牙首相仍在欲擒故纵，但我猜，他今年会提出申请。该计划可能最终变得有名无实。就像在安徒生(Hans Christian Andersen)的童话故事里一样——我是在丹麦撰写这篇专栏文章的——可能不久以后，债券市场的某个孩子就会指出，马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)身上什么都没穿。

Second, it has been, and continues to be, official policy that countries must heap one austerity programme on top of another if they miss nominal deficit targets – which they do because they keep underestimating the fiscal multiplier. Finally, even though I assume that eurozone leaders want to set up a meaningful banking union, I see no chance that this will lead to a separation of banking and sovereign risks. Angela Merkel stated clearly that this was not going to happen.

其次，官方政策一直、也将继续是：如果各国没有实现名义赤字目标（而它们也确实没有实现，因为它们一直低估财政乘数），就必须一个接一个地实行紧缩计划。最后，即使我假设，欧元区领导人想要建立一个发挥作用的银行业联盟，我也认为这不可能造成银行业风险和主权风险分离。更何况安格拉·默克尔(Angela Merkel)明确表示，不会支持建立银行业联盟。

The main significance of the OMT, should it ever become a reality, would be to prevent a contagious spiral between bank debt and sovereign debt for approximately two to three years. This would be important in its own right, but does not in itself improve the underlying solvency of the various entities, given current policy choices.

假如OMT成为现实，其主要意义将在于，在大约2至3年内防范银行债务和主权债务发生传染性的螺旋上升。这一点本身很重要，但鉴于目前的政策选择，它本身不会改善不同实体的根本偿付能力。

You have to make some brave assumptions about the future – continued rollover, separation of banking and sovereign risks, readiness for fiscal transfers, readiness to abandon austerity – all of which stand in complete contrast to officially announced policies. Solvency thus depends on the assumption that official policy is a lie. One could make that assumption, of course. I have not, and would not.

你必须对未来做出一些大胆的假设——债务继续展期、银行业风险和主权风险分离、政府准备好做财政转移和放弃紧缩——所有这些都与官方宣布的政策完全相悖。因此，偿付能力取决于这样的假设：官方政策是一个谎言。当然，人们可能会做出这种假设。我没有做过，也不会这样做。