金砖国家的微观缺陷

A year ago, Brazil, Russia, India and China were the darlings of the world economy. Today, Brazil is barely growing, Russia is struggling and India and China are on course for their lowest growth in a decade. Although they are as different as they are similar, all four of the original Bric countries have contrived to stumble simultaneously. The lessons are that microeconomics can matter as much as macroeconomics – and that belonging to a prestigious economic club is hazardous.

一年前，巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国还是世界经济的宠儿。如今，巴西经济增长近乎停滞，俄罗斯苦苦挣扎，印度和中国也将迎来十年最低的增长率。尽管它们相互之间的差异之大一点都不亚于它们的相似程度，但“金砖国家(Brics)中的四个原始成员都同时绊了跟头。从中可以得到两点教训：微观经济与宏观经济同样重要，以及加入一个显赫的经济俱乐部是有危险的。

The Brics, and emerging economies generally, deserve enormous credit for their macroeconomic management. In the 1970s and 1980s, one in two emerging and developing economies had double-digit inflation. Today, fewer than one in five do. As recently as the 1990s, the median emerging economy had public debt to gross domestic product of more than 65 per cent. In the past two years, the median has been below 40 per cent. Add in bulging foreign exchange reserves, debt denominated in domestic currency rather than dollars and (with China the big exception) flexible exchange rates, and the hype surrounding emerging economies seems almost reasonable.

“金砖国家——乃至全体新兴经济体——在宏观经济管理方面值得高度赞扬。20世纪七、八十年代，在所有新兴和发展中经济体中，有一半国家的通胀率都达到了两位数。如今，通胀率处于两位数水平的不到五分之一。就在20世纪90年代，新兴经济体公共债务与国内生产总值之比的中值还在65%以上。但在过去两年，这一中值已降至40%以下。如果再考虑到与日俱增的外汇储备、以本国货币而不是美元计价的债务和灵活的汇率（中国是明显的例外），对新兴经济体的热捧看上去几乎是合理的。

Since the emerging market crises of 1997-2002, these strong macro foundations have delivered extraordinary performance. As the IMF noted in its October World Economic Outlook, the past decade witnessed the first time that emerging economies enjoyed longer expansions and shorter downturns than advanced economies. When the global financial crisis hit, emerging economies’ budget deficits were small so the fiscal counterattack could be forceful. Inflation was quiescent so credit could be eased safely. In the 1990s, emerging economies that cut interest rates were punished with capital flight and currency collapse, triggering the bankruptcy of businesses with debts in dollars. This time, ample foreign exchange reserves offset capital flight and the shift away from dollar borrowing insured companies against depreciation.

在1997年至2002年的新兴市场危机之后，这些坚实的宏观经济基础造就了优异的表现。正如IMF在10月份的《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)中所提到的那样，过去十年首次出现了新兴经济体持续扩张时间长于发达经济体、衰退时间短于发达经济体的现象。当全球金融危机来袭时，新兴经济体的预算赤字较低，因此完全可以采取有力的财政应对措施。静止的通胀率使它们得以放心地放宽信贷。20世纪90年代，下调利率的新兴经济体受到了资本外逃和货币急剧贬值的惩罚，并导致背负美元债务的企业纷纷破产。这一次，充足的外汇储备抵消了资本外逃，减少借入美元债务的行为保障了企业不会受到贬值影响。

That is the good news. But, as the rich world discovered in the wake of its own “Great Moderation, resilient growth encourages complacency. In the US, households borrowed too much and regulators grew indulgent. In Europe, this pattern was amplified by the “club effect of euro membership. Countries that had tightened their belts to meet the criteria for accession went soft once they were admitted. With cheap foreign capital buoying living standards, there was no will to fix microeconomic problems such as sclerotic labour markets.

这是好消息。然而，正如富裕国家在其“大缓和(Great Moderation)时代后发现的那样，稳健的增长会滋生自满情绪。在美国，家庭借贷过多，但监管机构坐视不管。在欧洲，欧元区成员国资格的“俱乐部效应进一步增加了这种自满。一些国家为达到加入欧元区的标准而“勒紧腰带，一旦加入后却放松下来。既然廉价的外国资本提高了生活水准，这些国家自然也就失去了解决劳动力市场僵化等微观经济问题的意愿。

The Brics are following a version of this playbook. Macroeconomic management remains credible. China, in particular, has dramatically cut export dependence without suffering a hard landing. But macro success has bred micro complacency. Governments have permitted themselves to meddle destructively in markets. State companies have been allowed to stifle innovative competitors. The upshot is that the resilience of the Brics in the face of the 2008 financial shock has not been matched by resilience to an extended period of weak global demand.

“金砖国家正照着类似的剧本行事。它们的宏观经济管理仍然可靠，尤其是中国，它在避免硬着陆的情况下显著降低了对出口的依赖。但宏观经济上的成功滋生了微观经济领域的自满。政府肆无忌惮地对市场进行破坏性干预，并放任国有企业打压具有创新能力的竞争对手。结果就是，“金砖国家成功度过了2008年金融危机，但面对全球需求的持续疲软，它们则缺乏抵抗力。

Consider Brazil. It boasts moderate inflation, sober public finances and a partially flexible exchange rate. Its central bank has tried to revive growth by reducing its lending rate by 525 basis points over the past 16 months. But growth this year will come in at barely more than 1 per cent because a blizzard of micro meddling has damaged business confidence. Petrobras, the state oil company that accounts for a 10th of the economy, epitomises this malady. Despite the discovery in 2007 of lucrative offshore oil, it is losing money because of local content rules and irrational fixed prices.

以巴西为例。巴西通胀率较低，公共财政稳健，汇率有一定的灵活性。在过去16个月内，巴西央行将贷款利率累计下调525个基点，以图恢复经济增长。然而，由于一连串的微观干预损伤企业信心，巴西今年的经济增长率预计将仅略高于1%。规模占巴西经济10%的巴西国家石油公司(Petrobras)便深受其害。该公司尽管于2007年发现极具开采价值的近海石油，但当地成分要求(local content rules)和不合理的定价机制使其处于亏损状态。

The story is similar in Russia. The current account is in surplus, inflation is modest and the budget is in balance. But microeconomic policy is lousy. Corruption deters investors. State companies elbow out private ones. Plans to diversify the economy have been a failure. Instead of building manufacturing exports, Russia is exporting skilled workers.

俄罗斯的情况与之相似：经常账户存在盈余，通胀率较低，预算平衡。但该国微观经济政策极为糟糕，腐败吓退投资者，国企排挤私企，经济多元化计划未能成功。俄罗斯未能实现制造业出口，反而在输出熟练劳动力。

In some ways India is the odd one out: it runs a chronic budget deficit but shares the microeconomic weaknesses of its brethren. Corruption is pervasive and dysfunctional regulation inflicted blackouts on 600m consumers in the summer. Supply side rigidities handicap India’s economy so thoroughly that stimulus quickly causes inflation, which is close to 10 per cent. Last year the IMF projected India could sustain growth of 8.1 per cent per year. This year that has been revised to 6.9 per cent.

在某种程度上，印度有些独特：它长期存在预算赤字。不过，它在微观经济方面存在与其他成员国一样的缺陷。腐败无处不在，今年夏天因管理不力造成影响6亿用户的大规模停电。供应面的僵化严重妨碍了印度经济发展，使得刺激政策很快演化为接近10%的通胀率。去年国际货币基金组织(IMF)还预测印度有望维持8.1%的年经济增长率，但在今年就将这一数字下调为6.9%。

The IMF’s estimate of trend growth in China has come down from 9.5 per cent to 8.5 per cent. As elsewhere, corruption and distorted prices are the key challenges. State-owned companies account for more than half the capitalisation of the stock market. They hog subsidised credit, hire the best graduates and lobby fiercely against deregulation. Li Keqiang, the incoming premier, recently said that China had used up its “demographic dividend of plentiful labour and would now have to rely on a “reform dividend. But China has yet to act accordingly.

IMF对中国趋势增长率的预计从9.5%下调至8.5%。与其他国家一样，腐败和价格扭曲是中国的关键挑战。国有企业占了该国股市一半以上的市值。它们独享补贴性的信贷，聘用最优秀的毕业生，积极游说反对放松管制。将出任总理的李克强近期表示，中国快要耗尽充足劳动力带来的“人口红利，现在必须依靠“改革红利。但中国尚未采取相应行动。

For all their macroeconomic resilience, the business climate in the Brics is unreliable. In the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings, China comes in a shameful 91st, Russia 112th, Brazil 130th and India 132nd. By contrast, Rwanda, Oman, Colombia and Kazakhstan are all in the top 60. The Rocks could teach the Brics how to regain momentum.

尽管宏观经济稳健，但“金砖国家的商业环境并不可靠。在世界银行(World Bank)的“经商环境(Doing Business)排名中，中国才排在第91位，俄罗斯排第112位，巴西排第130位，印度排第132位。反而是卢旺达、阿曼、哥伦比亚和哈萨克斯坦纷纷跻身前60之列。这些“石头国家（Rocks，即这些国家名称的首字母组合）能告诉“金砖国家如何重拾动力。

The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an FT contributing editor

本文作者是美国外交关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)高级研究员、英国《金融时报》特约编辑