The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was warned as early as mid-2008 that banks may have been misreporting their Libor borrowing rate to aid their own trading positions, much earlier than previously known.
纽约联邦储备银行(Federal Reserve Bank of New York)早在2008年中期就得到警告,银行可能一直在谎报伦敦银行间同业拆借利率(Libor)报价,使之有利于它们自己的交易头寸,这远早于早先所知的时间。
Tim Geithner, then president of the New York Fed and now US Treasury secretary, was told by a senior colleague in a May 2008 email of her concerns about banks’ deliberate misreporting.
2008年5月,纽约联储的一位高级官员海利·博斯基(Hayley Boesky)向当时的总裁、现任美国财长的蒂姆·盖特纳(Tim Geithner)发了一封电子邮件,表达了她对银行故意虚报Libor利率的担忧。
The email was part of an internal push among some at the New York Fed to press the Bank of England and the British Bankers' Association to reform the benchmark lending gauge, known as the London Interbank Offered Rate.
纽约联储的一些人在内部发起一项行动,敦促英国央行(BOE)和英国银行家协会(BBA)改革基准贷款标准,即所谓的伦敦银行间同业拆借利率,上述邮件正是这种努力的一部分。
It is the first indication that suspicions among officials at the New York Fed went beyond deliberate underreporting of borrowing costs by banks to mask their financial health. Instead, misreporting may have occurred in an effort to improve trading results.
这首次表明,纽约联储的官员们不仅怀疑银行故意低报借款成本以掩盖财务健康问题。实际上,它们还可能扭曲Libor报价以改善交易结果。
The email from Hayley Boesky to Mr Geithner – with three senior colleagues, Meg McConnell, Matthew Raskin and William Dudley, copied in – are among unreported emails seen by the FT that show New York Fed officials linking the incentive for banks to misreport borrowing rates to the bank’s derivatives positions.
英国《金融时报》看到的一些没有见诸报道的电子邮件表明,纽约联储官员认为,银行虚报借款利率的动机与它们的衍生品头寸有关。博斯基发给盖特纳的邮件就是其中之一。这封邮件同时抄送给了三位高级官员梅格·麦康奈尔(Meg McConnell)、马修·拉斯金(Matthew Raskin)和威廉·达德利(William Dudley)。
The plea by Ms Boesky, sent a few days before Mr Geithner made Libor reform recommendations to Sir Mervyn King, governor of the BoE, is perhaps the first indication that senior US officials suspected traders may have been influencing banks’ Libor submissions.
博斯基在盖特纳向英国央行行长默文·金爵士(Sir Mervyn King)提议改革Libor的数天前发送的这封邮件或许是最早的迹象,表明美国高级官员怀疑交易员们一直在影响银行的Libor报价。
“These individuals report to the head of [the] money markets desk, who often reports to the same person who oversees the derivatives book. They verify the posting with the boss to make sure it suits their derivatives position, Ms Boesky wrote on May 23 2008.
博斯基在2008年5月23日发送的邮件中写道:“这些人向货币市场部门主管报告,后者通常向主管衍生品交易的同一个人报告。他们向这位上司核实报价,以确保报价适合他们的衍生品头寸。
The US Congress has launched an inquiry into Libor. In July, the New York Fed made public selected documents related to alleged Libor-rigging by Barclays, which had just reached a $450m settlement with US and UK authorities. Barclays admitted to taking requests from its own derivatives traders and those at other banks into account when making submissions to Libor and Euribor, the euro equivalent, from 2005 to 2007.
美国国会对Libor展开了调查。今年7月,纽约联储公开了巴克莱(Barclays)涉嫌操纵Libor的部分相关文件。巴克莱近期与美国和英国当局就此达成了4.5亿美元的和解。巴克莱承认,在2005年至2007年期间提交Libor和欧洲银行间欧元同业拆借利率(Euribor)报价时,考虑了本行以及其他银行的衍生品交易员的请求。
The New York Fed documents played down the possibility of a link between alleged rate manipulation to traders’ derivatives positions. Rather, in those documents New York Fed officials linked Libor misreporting to banks’ fears of appearing financially weak.
纽约联储的这些文件淡化了银行涉嫌利率操纵行为与银行交易员衍生品头寸存在关联的可能性。相反,在这些文件中,纽约联储官员将扭曲Libor报价与银行担心财务状况不好看联系起来。
Other emails seen by the FT at the New York Fed raised concerns about the possible influence of derivatives traders.
英国《金融时报》在纽约联储见到的其他邮件,令人对衍生品交易员可能施加的影响感到担忧。
A New York Fed spokeswoman said the regulator developed “tough reform proposals for Libor, including a suggestion that banks’ submissions be audited. A representative of Ms Boesky declined to comment. The Treasury did not respond to requests for comment.
纽约联储的一位发言人表示,纽约联储就Libor提出了“严厉的改革建议,包括建议对银行报价进行审计。博斯基的代表拒绝置评。美国财政部没有回应记者要求置评的请求。
上一篇: 教育代金券可行么?
下一篇: 财政悬崖面前 以不变应万变