2014考研经济学人中英文对照思维机器出故障了吗

　　ErikBrynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee of MIT make use of this image in their e-book Race Against the Machine. By the measureknown as Moore s law, the ability to get calculations out of a piece of silicondoubles every 18 months. That growth rate will not last for ever; but otheraspects of computation, such as the capacity of algorithms to handle data, arealso growing exponentially. When such a capacity is low, that doubling does notmatter. As soon as it matters at all, though, it can quickly start to matter alot. On the second half of the chessboard not only has the cumulative effect ofinnovations become large, but each new iteration of innovation delivers atechnological jolt as powerful as all previous rounds combined.

　　麻省理工学院的埃里克布伦乔尔森和安德鲁麦克菲在他们的电子书《与机器赛跑》中引用了以上这个例子。根据众所周知的摩尔定律，从一片硅片中得到计算的能力每18个月翻一番。这种增长的速率不会永远保持下去;但是，计算机在其他方面的能力，如处理数据的算法，也在成倍地增长。当这种能力处于低水平时，翻番起不了多大的作用。不过，一旦它开始发挥作用的时候，它能迅速地影响许多事物。棋盘的下半部分不仅仅是创新的累计效应在增强，而且每一项新的创新都带来某种技术方面的突飞猛进，其能量如同以前所有技术加起来那么强大。

　　Theother side of the sky

　　天空的另一面

　　Asan example of this acceleration-of-effect they offer autonomous vehicles. In2004 the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency , a branch ofAmerica s Department of Defence, set up a race for driverless cars thatpromised $1 million to the team whose vehicle finished the 240km route fastest. Not one of the robotic entrants completed the course. In August2012 Google announced that its fleet of autonomous vehicles had completed somehalf a million kilometres of accident-free test runs. Several American stateshave passed or are weighing regulations for driverless cars; arobotic-transport revolution that seemed impossible ten years ago may be herein ten more.

　　自动汽车为这种加速效应提供了一个例证。在2004年的时候，美国国防部下属的国防高级研究计划局发起了一项无人驾驶汽车的竞赛，并为造出以最快速度跑完240公里车辆的团队提供了100万美元的奖金。结果，没有一辆自动车辆完成比赛。到2012年8月，谷歌公司宣布其自动驾驶车队中的佼佼者已经数次通过50万公里无事故测试。美国数个州已经通过或是正在考虑无人驾驶汽车的法规;一场在10年前还看起来不可能实现的自动化交通革命可能会在10年后成为现实。

　　Thatonly scratches the surface. Across the board, innovations fuelled by cheapprocessing power are taking off. Computers are beginning to understand naturallanguage. People are controlling video games through body movement alonea technology that may soon find application in much of the businessworld. Three-dimensional printing is capable of churning out an increasinglycomplex array of objects, and may soon move on to human tissues and otherorganic material.

　　这仅仅触及了表面。纵观全局，由廉价处理器引发的创新正在形成中。计算机开始懂得自然语言。人们正通过单独的肢体运动在操控游戏这项技术可能过不了多久就能应用在商业中。3D打印能够批量打印出日益复杂的各种物体，并且可能不久将应用到打印人类细胞组织以及其他器官方面。

　　Aninnovation pessimist could dismiss this as jamtomorrow. But the idea that technology-led growth musteither continue unabated or steadily decline, rather than ebbing and flowing,is at odds with history. Chad Syverson of the University of Chicago points outthat productivity growth during the age of electrification was lumpy. Growthwas slow during a period of important electrical innovations in the late 19thand early 20th centuries; then it surged. The information-age trajectory lookspretty similar .

　　创新的悲观派可能斥之为可望而不可即。有观点认为，技术引领的增长要么是持续向上要么是稳定的下降，而不是起起落落。但是，这种想法有悖于历史。芝加哥大学的Chad Syverson指出，电气化时代的生产率增长呈破浪起伏的状态。在19世纪后期和20世纪早期是重要的电器化创新时期，在这段时期内，增长缓慢;随后，增长快速提高。信息时的发展轨迹同此高度相似。

　　Itmay be that the 1970s-and-after slowdown in which the technological pessimistsset such store can be understood in this wayas apause, rather than a permanent inflection. The period from the early 1970s tothe mid-1990s may simply represent one in which the contributions of earliermajor innovations were exhausted while computing, biotechnology, personalcommunication and the rest of the technologies of today and tomorrow remainedtoo small a part of the economy to influence overall growth.

　　对技术悲观派相当看重的20世纪70年代及其以后的放缓或许可以这样理解这就像是一个暂时的停顿而不是一个永远的拐点。从20世纪70年代早期到90年代中期这段时间可能仅仅代表了这样一段时间，在这段时间内早期的主要创新的贡献已经枯竭，而计算机、生物技术、个人通讯以及其余的当前和未来的技术仍只占经济的一小部分，从而无法对整体的增长产生影响。

　　Other potential culprits loom, howeversome of which,worryingly, might be permanent in their effects. Much of the economy is moreheavily regulated than it was a century ago. Environmental protection hasprovided cleaner air and water, which improve people s lives. Indeed, to theextent that such gains are not captured in measurements of GDP, the slowdown inprogress from the 1970s is overstated. But if that is so, it will probablycontinue to be so for future technological change. And poorly craftedregulations may unduly raise the cost of new research, discouraging furtherinnovation.

　　然而，其他的潜在威胁正在逼近令人担忧的是，有些威胁的影响可能是永久的。同一个世纪之前相比，如今，大部分经济所接受的监管要沉重的多。环境保护提供了更清洁的空气和水，提高了人们的生活质量。实际上，这样的进步并没有被计算到GDP衡量标准中，因此，自20世纪70年代以来的进步放缓被夸大了。不过，若事实如此，那么对于未来的技术变革来说，可能依旧如此。而且，设计拙劣的规章制度可能会过度地提高新研究的成本，从而压制进一步的创新。

　　Another thing which may have changed permanently is the role ofgovernment. Technology pessimists rarely miss an opportunity to point to theApollo programme, crowning glory of a time in which government did not simplyfacilitate new innovation but provided an ongoing demand for talent andinvention. This it did most reliably through the military-industrial complex ofwhich Apollo was a spectacular and peculiarly inspirational outgrowth. Mr Thielis often critical of the venture-capital industry for its lack of interest inbig, world-changing ideas. Yet this is mostly a response to market realities.Private investors rationally prefer modest business models with a reasonablyshort time to profit and cash out.

　　另一个可能已经发生永久性变化的事情是政府的角色。技术悲观派一有机会就会提起阿波罗计划。那是一个有着无上光荣的时代，当时的政府除了促进新型创新之外，还对天才和发明有着持续不断的需求。这主要是依靠军事和产业的融合来实现的，对此阿波罗计划是这种融合的一个令人惊叹的和特别鼓舞人心的产物。泰尔时常对风投产业对重大的、改变世界的想法缺乏兴趣提出批评。然而，这主要是对市场现实的反应。私人投资者在理性上青睐于适度的商业模式，因为它具备在一个相当短的时间内让投资者获利变现的特点。

　　A third factor which might have been at play in both the 1970s andthe 2000s is energy. William Nordhaus of Yale University has found that theproductivity slowdown which started in the 1970s radiated outwards from themost energy-intensive sectors, a product of the decade s oil shocks. Dearenergy may help explain the productivity slowdown of the 2000s as well. But thisis a trend that one can hope to see reversed. In America, at least, newtechnologies are eating into those high prices. Mr Thiel is right to reservesome of his harshest criticism for the energy sector s lacklustre record oninnovation; but given the right market conditions it is not entirely hopeless.

　　可能在20世纪70年代和21世纪头十年都起作用的第三个因素是能源。耶鲁大学的威廉诺德豪斯发现，始于20世纪70年代的那次生产率放缓具有从搞耗能部门向外部扩散的特点，这是当时石油危机的产物。昂贵的石油或许也有助于解释21世纪头十年的生产力放缓。但是，这是一种人们有希望看到反转的趋势。在美国，新技术至少仍在降低那些高价格。部分保留对能源部门在创新方面的平淡无奇的业绩提出的最严厉的批评;但是，考虑到市场情况，这并不是完全没有希望。

　　Perhaps the most radical answer to the problem of the 1970s slowdownis that it was due to globalisation. In a somewhat whimsical 1987 paper, PaulRomer, then at the University of Rochester, sketched the possibility that, withmore workers available in developing countries, cutting labour costs in richones became less important. Investment in productivity was thus sidelined. Theidea was heretical among macroeconomists, as it dispensed with much of thecareful theoretical machinery then being used to analyse growth. But as MrRomer noted, economic historians comparing 19th-century Britain with Americacommonly credit relative labour scarcity in America with driving forward thecapital-intense and highly productive American system ofmanufacturing.

　　对20世纪70年代放缓这个问题的最激进的答案可能是将其归咎与全球化。在1987年发布的一份略带异想天开的报告中，当时在罗切斯特大学任教的保罗罗莫指出，随着发展中国家可用工人的增加，发达国家降低劳动成本的可能性就变得不再那么重要了。因此，投资于生产率被边缘化了。由于这种观点摒弃了当时用来分析增长的理论机制的绝大部分内容，因此被宏观经济学家认为是异类。但是，正如罗莫所指出的那样，经济史学家在对比19世纪的英国和美国时，通常把推进资本密集性产业和具备高度竞争力的美国体系制造业的原因归于美国的相对劳动力稀少。

　　The view from Serendip

　　塞伦迪普景观

　　Some economists are considering how Mr Romer s heresy might applytoday. Daron Acemoglu, Gino Gancia, and Fabrizio Zilibotti of MIT, CREi and the University of Zurich, havebuilt a model to study this. It shows firms in rich countries shippinglow-skill tasks abroad when offshoring costs little, thus driving apart thewages of skilled and unskilled workers at home. Over time, though, offshoringraises wages in less-skilled countries; that makes innovation at home moreenticing. Workers are in greater demand, the income distribution narrows, andthe economy comes to look more like the post-second-world-war period than the 1970sand their aftermath.

　　部分经济学家正在考虑如何将罗莫的异想天开应用于今天。麻省理工学院的Daron Acemoglu、CREi的Gino Gancia和苏黎世大学的Fabrizio Zilibotti创建了一个模型对此进行研究。研究显示，富国的公司在离岸成本降低的时候会将低技能的工作输出到海外，因而将本国有技能的工人与无技能的工人的工资割裂开来。然而，随着时间的推移，外包提高了较低技能的国家的工资;这使得本国的创新更加诱人。对工人的需求在增加，收入分配在缩小。因而，经济越来越像二战后期，而不是像20世纪70年代及其之后那样。

　　Even if that model is mistaken, the rise of the emerging world isamong the biggest reasons for optimism. The larger the size of the globalmarket, the more the world benefits from a given new idea, since it can then beapplied across more activities and more people. Raising Asia s poor billionsinto the middle class will mean that millions of great minds that mightotherwise have toiled at subsistence farming can instead join the moderneconomy and share the burden of knowledge with rich-world researchersa sharingthat information technology makes ever easier.

　　就算这种模型有误，新兴国家的崛起也是乐观的最主要的原因之一。全球市场的规模越大，世界得之于某个特定新思想的益处越多，因为这种新思想随后能够在更多的活动和更多的人中得到应用。将亚洲的数亿穷人提升为中产意味着，那些原本有可能为生存农业而辛苦劳作的数百万生灵，反而能够加入到当代的经济中来，并且能同富国的研究者分担知识的负担信息技术使这种分享更加容易。

　　It may still be the case that some parts of the economy are immune,or at least resistant, to some of the productivity improvement that informationtechnology can offer. Sectors like health care, education and government, inwhich productivity has proved hard to increase, loom larger within the economythan in the past. The frequent absence of market pressure in such areas reducesthe pressure for cost savingsand for innovation.

　　仍然有可能会出现经济体的某些部分对信息技术能够提供的生产率提高具备免疫力，或者至少是表现出对抗性的情况。相比过去，像医疗保健、教育和政府等早已被证明难以提高生产率的部门对经济体的威胁要更紧迫。这些领域内常见的市场压力的缺失降低了节约成本以及创新的压力。

　　For some, though, the opposite outcome is the one to worry about.Messrs Brynjolfsson and McAfee fear that the technological advances of thesecond half of the chessboard could be disturbingly rapid, leaving a scourge oftechnological unemployment in their wake. They argue that new technologies andthe globalisation that they allow have already contributed to stagnant incomesand a decline in jobs that require moderate levels of skill. Further progresscould threaten jobs higher up and lower down the skill spectrum that had, untilnow, seemed safe.

　　相反的结果反而是需要担忧的原因之一。布伦乔尔森和迈克菲忧心的是，棋盘下半部分的技术进步可能会令人不安地快速，以及随之而来的技术性失业的痛苦。他们认为，新技术和全球化已经导致收入停滞和需要中等技能水平的工作在减少。进一步的提高可能威胁到更高级的工种，并且会降低那些到目前为止似乎是安全的技能分类。

　　Pattern-recognition software is increasingly good at performing thetasks of entry-level lawyers, scanning thousands of legal documents forrelevant passages. Algorithms are used to write basic newspaper articles onsporting outcomes and financial reports. In time, they may move to analysis.Manual tasks are also vulnerable. In Japan, where labour to care for an ageingpopulation is scarce, innovation in robotics is proceeding by leaps and bounds.The rising cost of looking after people across the rich world will onlyencourage further development.

　　模式识别软件越来越擅长于完成初级律师的工作，并且为相关的信息而扫描数千页的文件。算法被用来写作有关比赛结果和金融报道等简单的资讯稿件。它们可能迟早会转向分析工作。人力劳动也。在日本，照料老年人的劳力非常稀缺，因而机器人创新正在大踏步地前进。在富国，照顾别人的费用的提高只会鼓励进一步的发展。

　　Such productivity advances should generate enormous welfare gains.Yet the adjustment period could be difficult. In the end, the main risk toadvanced economies may not be that the pace of innovation is too slow, but thatinstitutions have become too rigid to accommodate truly revolutionary changeswhich couldbe a lot more likely than flying cars.

　　如此的生产率进步应该带来巨大的福利成果。然而，调整阶段可能是难熬的。总之，发达经济体的主要风险可能不在于创新的步伐过慢，而是在于机构已经变得过于僵化，从而不去适应真正的革命性变革这种变革比会飞的汽车更有可能发生。

　　【注】本文的小标题均出自英国科幻小说家AC克拉克的作品。