紧缩政策有悖经济常识

More than four years after the financial crisis began, the world’s major advanced economies remain deeply depressed, in a scene all too reminiscent of the 1930s. The reason is simple: we are relying on the same ideas that governed policy during that decade. These ideas, long since disproved, involve profound errors both about the causes of the crisis, its nature and the appropriate response.

金融危机爆发距今已有4年多时间，世界主要发达经济体仍极不景气，这一切太容易让人联想起上世纪30年代了。原因很简单：如今我们遵循的思想，正是指导那十年里各项政策的思想。自那以后，这些思想已被证明是错误的，在危机的起因、性质和适宜的应对方法方面都存在严重错误。

These ideas have taken root in the public consciousness, providing support for the excessive austerity of fiscal policies in many countries. So the time is ripe for a manifesto in which mainstream economists offer the public a more evidence-based analysis of our problems.

这些思想已在公众观念中扎根，正为许多国家的过度财政紧缩政策提供着支持。因此，如今主流经济学家向公众纠正这些思想的时机已经成熟，我们要提供一份对眼下问题更加实事求是的分析。

The causes. Many policy makers insist that the crisis was caused by irresponsible public borrowing. With very few exceptions – such as Greece – this is false. Instead, the conditions for the crisis were created by excessive private sector borrowing and lending, including by over-leveraged banks. The bursting of this bubble led to large falls in output and thus in tax revenue. Today’s government deficits are a consequence of the crisis, not a cause.

首先说危机的起因。许多政策制定者坚称，危机是由政府不负责任地发行公债引起的。这个结论在大部分情况下不符合事实，只有希腊等少数几个例外。其实，造成危机的原因是私人部门过度借贷，包括银行过度杠杆化。泡沫的破裂导致经济产出大幅下滑，致使税收收入大幅减少。如今政府的赤字问题是危机的结果，而非原因。

The nature of the crisis. When property bubbles burst on both sides of the Atlantic, many parts of the private sector slashed spending in an attempt to pay down past debts. This was a rational response on the part of individuals, but has proved to be collectively self-defeating, because one person’s spending is another person’s income. The result of the spending collapse has been an economic depression that has worsened the public debt.

其次说危机的性质。房地产泡沫在大西洋两岸破裂时，私人部门许多领域纷纷削减开支，试图偿还旧债。从个人的角度来看，这种反应是合理的，但事实证明，从整体来看，这种反应是适得其反的，因为一个人的支出就是另一个人的收入。支出的急剧减少导致了经济萧条，而经济萧条恶化了公共债务问题。

The appropriate response. At a time when the private sector is engaged in a collective effort to spend less, public policy should act as a stabilising force, attempting to sustain spending. At the very least, we should not be making things worse with big cuts in government spending or big increases in tax rates on ordinary people.

再来说合理的应对之道。私人部门集体努力削减开支的时候，公共政策应起到平衡这种影响的作用，努力维持一定水平的支出。最起码，我们不应大幅削减政府支出，或大幅提高针对普通人的税率，这两种举措会令情形更加恶化。

The big mistake. After responding well in the first, acute phase of the crisis, policy took a wrong turn – focusing on government deficits and arguing that the public sector should attempt to reduce its debts in tandem with the private sector. Instead of playing a stabilising role, fiscal policy has ended up reinforcing the damping effects of private-sector spending cuts.

最后说说我们犯了什么重大错误。危机急剧爆发后的最初阶段，我们的反应是正确的，随后，我们的政策走上了歧途——开始专注于政府赤字，辩称公共部门应与私人部门一道努力减少债务。财政政策不仅没有起到平衡的作用，反而最终跟私人部门一起削减开支，加剧了对经济的抑制作用。

In the face of a less severe shock, monetary policy could take up the slack. But with interest rates close to zero, monetary policy – while it should do all it can – cannot do the whole job. There must of course be a medium-term plan for reducing the government deficit. But if this is too front-loaded it can easily be self-defeating by aborting the recovery. A key priority is to reduce unemployment, before it becomes endemic, making recovery and future deficit reduction even more difficult.

如果危机的情形不那么严重，我们或许能通过货币政策进行补救。但在利率已经接近于零的情况下，单凭货币政策无法挽救局面（尽管它本应竭尽全力）。当然，我们必须制定减少政府赤字的中期计划。但如果太急于在较近期内实施这样的计划，很可能弄巧成拙，因为这可能导致经济复苏流产。我们的当务之急是降低失业率，以防止失业变得过于普遍，从而加大经济复苏和未来减少赤字的难度。

How do those who support the existing approach respond to ours? They typically use two arguments.

现行方法的支持者们会如何反驳我们的观点呢？他们一般用两条理由来反驳。

The confidence argument. Their first argument is that government deficits will raise interest rates and thus prevent recovery. By contrast, austerity will increase confidence and encourage recovery.

第一条：信心。他们说，政府赤字将导致利率升高，从而阻止经济复苏。相反，紧缩将增强人们的信心，促进经济复苏。

But there is no evidence in favour of this argument. Despite exceptionally high deficits, interest rates are unprecedentedly low in all major countries where there is a normally functioning central bank. Interest rates are only high in some eurozone countries, because the European Central Bank is not allowed to act as lender of last resort to the government. Elsewhere the central bank can always, if needed, fund the deficit, leaving the bond market unaffected.

但这条理由缺乏证据支持。在央行正常发挥职能的所有主要国家，尽管赤字高企，利率却处于前所未有的低位。高利率的情况仅出现在一些欧元区国家，因为欧洲央行(ECB)无权做这些国家政府的最后贷款人。在其他地方，央行永远可以在必要的时候为赤字提供资金，使债券市场不受影响。

Experience includes no relevant case where budget cuts have actually generated increased economic activity. The International Monetary Fund has studied 173 cases of budget cuts in individual countries and found that the consistent result is economic contraction. That is what is happening: the countries with the biggest budget cuts have experienced the biggest falls in output.

并无相关实例证明削减预算可以增加经济活跃度。国际货币基金组织(IMF)研究了不同国家的173个削减预算的例子后发现，在这些例子中，削减预算无一例外地导致了经济收缩。当下的情况也是如此：那些预算削减幅度最大的国家，也出现了幅度最大的产出下滑。

For the truth, as we can now see, is that budget cuts do not inspire business confidence. Companies will only invest when they can foresee enough customers with enough income to spend. Austerity discourages investment.

事实上，如我们所见，削减预算并不能提振企业信心。企业只有在预见到存在足够多具备消费能力的消费者时，才会增加投资。紧缩政策抑制投资。

The structural argument. A second argument against expanding demand is that output is in fact constrained on the supply side – by structural imbalances. If this theory were right, however, at least some parts of our economies ought to be at full stretch, and so should some occupations. But in most countries that is not the case. So the problem must be a general lack of spending and demand.

第二条理由：结构。反对扩大需求的第二条理由是，限制产出的实际上是供给方面的因素——结构性不平衡。然而，如果这个理论成立，那么在我们的经济中，至少应该有部分领域和工作岗位是在开足马力的。但在大多数国家，情况并非如此。因此，问题一定是支出与需求的普遍不足。

In the 1930s the same structural argument was used against proactive spending policies in the US. But as spending rose between 1940 and 1942, output rose by 20 per cent. So the problem in the 1930s, as now, was a shortage of demand, not of supply.

在上世纪30年代的美国，人们也曾同样用结构性理由反对积极的支出政策。但在1940年至1942年之间，随着支出的增加，产出提高了20%。因此，上世纪30年代的问题如今日一样，是需求不足，而非供给不足。

As a result of their mistaken ideas, many western policy makers are inflicting massive suffering on their peoples. But the ideas they espouse about how to handle recessions were rejected by nearly all economists after the disasters of the 1930s. It is tragic that in recent years the old ideas have again taken root.

因为指导思想错误，许多西方政策制定者正在令他们的人民遭受巨大的痛苦。但这些人关于如何应对衰退所持有的观点，是上世纪30年代金融灾难后被几乎所有经济学家所否定的。可悲的是，近年来，这些老思想又卷土重来。

The best policies will differ between countries and will require debate. But they must be based on a correct analysis of the problem. We therefore urge all economists and others who agree with the broad thrust of this manifesto for economic sense to register their agreement online and to publicly argue the case for a sounder approach. The whole world suffers when men and women are silent about what they know is wrong.

最好的政策将因国家而异，并且需要经过辩论。但前提是，这些政策必须首先对问题有正确的分析。因此，我们必须敦促所有经济学家和其他支持发出这份“经济常识宣言的人，在网络上签名表示支持，公开呼吁各国改进危机应对方法。如果所有人明知错误的存在，却不发一言，整个世界都会遭殃。

The writers are professors at Princeton University and the London School of Economics