民主是拯救欧元之战中的败者

The European Central Bank has fired its magic bullet. By promising “unlimited purchases of sovereign bonds, Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president, may have kept his pledge to do “whatever it takes to save the euro. But in rescuing the currency, Mr Draghi’s magic bullet has badly wounded something even more important – democracy in Europe.

欧洲央行打出了那颗神奇的子弹。通过承诺将“无限量购买主权债券，欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)或许信守了他“不惜一切代价拯救欧元的诺言。但他的这颗神奇子弹在拯救欧元的同时，也严重误伤了一项更为重要的东西——欧洲的民主。

As a result of the ECB’s actions, voters from Germany to Spain will increasingly find that crucial decisions about national economic policy can no longer be changed at the ballot box. In Germany, in particular, there is a growing realisation that the ECB, an unelected body that prides itself on its independence from government, has just taken a decision that has profound implications for German taxpayers – but one that they cannot challenge or change.

欧洲央行的行动导致了一个结果：从德国到西班牙，欧洲各国选民将越来越深切地感到，投票箱不再能改变一些关于国家经济政策的关键决定。特别是在德国，人们越来越清楚地意识到，一个标榜自己独立于政府的、非选举产生的机构——即欧洲央行——刚刚作出了一个对德国纳税人影响巨大的决定，而德国纳税人却无法去质疑或改变这个决定。

Previous European bailouts had to be approved by the German parliament and were subject to review by the German courts. Indeed the German supreme court will rule on the constitutionality of the most recent bailout, tomorrow. But the ECB’s decision to accept unlimited bond purchases is immune to such democratic controls. The bank cannot be overruled by the German parliament. And because it is an EU institution, the ECB cannot be checked by the German courts – only by the European Court of Justice.

过去，欧盟的纾困必须得到德国国会的批准，还必须接受德国法院的复审。事实上，德国宪法法院刚刚对最近一次纾困是否违宪作出了裁决。但欧洲央行作出的无限量债券购买决定，却不受此类民主机制制约。德国国会不能推翻欧洲央行的决定。另外，因为欧洲央行是欧盟机构，所以它不受德国法院管辖，只受欧洲法院(European Court of Justice)管辖。

At the ECB, the president of the German central bank has just one vote – the same as the presidents of the central banks of Malta or Slovenia. Jens Weidmann, the head of the Bundesbank, cast the sole vote against the bond-buying plans.

在欧洲央行，德国央行(Bundesbank)行长手中只有一票，跟马耳他或斯洛文尼亚央行行长手中的票数一样。欧洲央行债券购买计划表决时，德国央行行长延斯·魏德曼(Jens Weidmann)投下了唯一的一张反对票。

Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, may well have given tacit consent to the ECB’s actions and one German member of the ECB council voted with the majority. But opinion polls and media comment suggest that Mr Weidmann’s position reflects majority opinion in Germany. After the ECB decision, the Bundesbank issued a statement arguing that the ECB’s plans are “tantamount to financing government by printing banknotes and “redistribute considerable risks among various countries’ taxpayers. Translation: the ECB’s action are illegal and dangerous, and German taxpayers could end up with the bill.

德国总理安格拉·默克尔(Angela Merkel)很可能在心底是赞同欧洲央行上述行动的，欧洲央行理事会的一名德国籍理事投的也是赞成票。但民调和媒体评论显示，魏德曼的立场反应了德国大部分人的态度。欧洲央行的决定宣布后，德国央行发表声明称，欧洲央行的计划“相当于用印钞票的方式来为政府融资，也相当于“将相当大的风险转移到了各国纳税人身上——说白了就是：欧洲央行的行动既不合法又非常危险，而最终为其埋单的可能是德国的纳税人。

Of course, the Germans – above all – have always revered central bank independence. Under normal circumstances, it is a fine tradition. But in the euro crisis, the ECB is suddenly behaving in a way that veers wildly from the Germanic view of prudent central banking.

当然，德国一直尊重央行的独立性，在这一点上其他国家无出其右。正常情况下，这是项优良传统。但在欧元区危机中，欧洲央行的行为方式突然严重走偏，不再符合德国人对审慎央行行为的定义。

It is not just Germans who have reason to feel nervous about the democratic implications of what the ECB has done. To access the ECB’s unlimited firepower, the Spanish or Italians would have to agree to “enter a programme – which sounds unpleasantly like the kind of condition that is laid down for a wayward drug addict. In reality, Madrid or Rome would have to accept International Monetary Fund-style supervision of their national budgets, directed from Brussels and Frankfurt. Such a humiliating and overt loss of national sovereignty, combined with a deep recession, would be the perfect formula to drive voters to the political extremes, as Greece is demonstrating.

有理由为欧洲央行行为对民主的影响感到担心的，不只是德国人。为了获得欧洲央行无限量的弹药供应，西班牙和意大利人将不得不同意“加入一项计划——这听上去令人不快，像是为难以管控的瘾君子定下的那类规定。事实上，西班牙或意大利政府将不得不接受布鲁塞尔或法兰克福对其预算施以“国际货币基金组织(IMF)式的监督。国家主权公开丧失带来的屈辱感，再加上严重的衰退，将是推动选民倒向政治极端主义的绝佳配方。希腊的情况就是明证。

Of course, European idealists would argue that talk of a loss of national sovereignty is outmoded. The euro is a pan-European currency so its fate should be decided by European voters and institutions – not by individual nations.

当然，欧洲的理想主义者可能会辩称，国家主权丧失的说法已经过时了。欧元是一种泛欧洲的货币，因此欧元的命运应由欧洲的选民和机构决定，而不是由具体国家决定。

In practice, however, the eurozone crisis is increasingly polarising European politics along national lines. In Italy and Spain there is now something close to a national position – uniting leftist and rightwing parties – against what are regarded as arrogant and self-centred German policies. In Germany, however, there is a left-right consensus that austerity in southern Europe must be the price of bailouts.

然而，事实上，随着欧元区危机的发展，欧洲各国的政治立场正在不断分化。在意大利和西班牙，全国上下几乎一致反对德国的政策，左翼政党和右翼政党甚至为此联合了起来，他们都认为德国的政策既傲慢又自私。但在德国，无论是左派还是右派，大家都一致认为，南欧国家必须实行紧缩政策，以换取欧盟的纾困。

So why has Mr Draghi done it? The answer is that he faced a truly hideous dilemma. It was clear that the hundreds of billions of euros committed to European bailout funds have not been enough to ward off the threat of collapsing banks and sovereign defaults across the eurozone. A financial calamity could lead to another Depression, followed by political radicalisation – and a threat to democracy that is much more direct and unsubtle than the menace posed by the ECB.

那么，德拉吉为何要采取上述行动？答案是，他面临一种非常可怕的两难处境。显然，欧洲纾困基金获得的数千亿欧元注资，不足以帮助整个欧元区抵御银行破产和主权债务违约的威胁。一场金融灾难可能会引发又一场“大萧条，进而点燃政治极端主义，并使民主受到威胁——这种威胁远比欧洲央行上述行动构成的威胁更为直接和明显。

By contrast, if Spanish and Italian borrowing costs come back under control – and their governments are prodded into making important structural economic reforms – then the ECB’s actions last week could yet be vindicated. Mr Draghi would not only have saved the euro – he would have bought Europe the time it needs to return to growth.

相比之下，如果西班牙和意大利的借款成本回落至可控水平、两国政府被迫开始进行重要的经济结构改革，那么欧洲央行上周的行动可能最终会被证明是正确的。也就是说，德拉吉可能不仅拯救了欧元，还为欧洲争取到了恢复增长所需的时间。

However, a great many things now have to go right simultaneously for Mr Draghi’s plan to work. It is rather more likely that political and economic unhappiness will grow in Europe over the next year – as Germany slips into recession and Italy and Spain (not to speak of Greece) struggle with ever deeper austerity. If the euro were ever to break up, the direct financial cost to Germany and other creditor nations – and the resulting backlash – could also be much higher, because of the ECB’s bond-buying programme.

然而，德拉吉的计划要想成功，需要多项因素配合。随着德国陷入衰退，随着意大利和西班牙（更不用说希腊）在不断深化的紧缩政策下艰难生存，未来一年欧洲在政治和经济方面很有可能会有更多坏消息。此外，如果欧元区真的解体，欧洲央行债券购买计划给德国和其他债权国造成直接经济损失可能会大大增加，由此引起的反弹也会强烈得多。

Certainly, for anyone with a sense of history, the sight of the German representative on the ECB being isolated and outvoted should be chilling. Since 1945, the central idea of the European project was never again to leave a powerful and aggrieved Germany isolated at the centre of Europe. We are now dangerously close to that point.

当然，任何对历史有点感悟的人都知道，如果欧洲央行中德国代表的意见受到孤立、并遭多数票否决，后果应该是令人不寒而栗的。自1945年以来，欧洲一体化的核心思想就是，绝不再孤立德国这个位于欧洲中心、实力强大而愤懑不平的国家。如今，我们快要碰到那条红线了。