毒贩如何在汇丰洗钱？

In March 2007, authorities raided the home of Zhenli Ye Gon, a pharmaceuticals magnate based in Mexico City. At his house in the plush suburb of Lomas de Chapultepec, they found $205.6m in hundred dollar bills. The piles of notes were so large they spilled out of the lounge, down the corridors and into the kitchen.

2007年3月，墨西哥警方突袭了墨西哥城医药巨头叶真理(Zhenli Ye Gon)的家。在高档的洛马斯德查普德派克区，警方在他的房子里发现2.056亿美元的百元美钞。钞票堆积如山，在客厅、走廊和厨房到处都是。

While the raid was going on, Mr Ye Gon was reportedly spotted in Las Vegas indulging in his favourite hobby: high-stakes poker. Now in a US prison awaiting extradition to Mexico, he stands accused of buying from China and then selling to drug gangs the precursor chemicals used to make methamphetamine, a stimulant known in north America as “crystal meth. As it happens, Mr Ye Gon was also a long-time client of banking giant HSBC.

突袭进行之际，据称有人看到叶真理在拉斯维加斯正沉溺于最喜欢的赌博项目：百家乐。目前叶真理正在美国监狱中等待向墨西哥引渡。他被控从中国购买用于制造甲基苯丙胺（一种在北美被称为“冰毒的兴奋剂）的前体化学品，然后卖给贩毒集团。碰巧，叶真理也是银行业巨擘汇丰(HSBC)的一名长期客户。

The episode, contained in a report this week from the US Senate, shows what American lawmakers have called a systemic failure by the UK’s largest bank to control money laundering in its global operations and stop such funds from entering the US.

美国参议院最近一份报告中描述的这段插曲显示，英国最大银行在其全球运营中控制洗钱、并阻止“脏钱进入美国方面，存在美国立法者所称的“系统性失灵问题。

The multi-year investigation uncovered that HSBC was a conduit for drug money, had clients with alleged ties to terrorism, and stripped details from transactions that would have identified Iranian entities – which may have put the bank in breach of US sanctions against that country. HSBC’s internal culture has been “pervasively polluted for a long time, said Senator Carl Levin, who led the investigation.

这项历时数年的调查发现，汇丰是毒品资金的流通渠道，拥有据称与恐怖主义有关联的客户，还从某些交易中剔除了本来可暴露伊朗实体的细节——这可能使汇丰违反了美国针对伊朗的制裁。负责调查的参议员卡尔·利文(Carl Levin)表示，汇丰内部文化“每一个角落都遭到长期污染。

The probe has shaken HSBC; prompted the resignation of David Bagley, the bank’s head of compliance; and – in the wake of the Libor rate-rigging scandal – further battered London’s reputation as a global financial centre.

这起调查震动了汇丰，导致合规主管大卫·贝格利(David Bagley)辞职，并在Libor汇率操纵丑闻之后，进一步打击了伦敦作为全球金融中心的名誉。

More than anything, it has shown the reach and depth of the world’s drug-trafficking and money-laundering businesses. From China to Mexico, the names of the locales and participants may seem exotic. Yet the business is often parochial, as Mr Ye Gon’s story shows.

最重要的是，调查显示出贩毒和洗钱活动的范围之广、触角之深。从中国到墨西哥，地点和参与者的名字或许看起来充满异域色彩，但正如叶真理一案所表明的，“生意往往是小圈子的。

Shortly after his arrest, Mr Ye Gon explained his fondness for gambling. Born in Shanghai in 1963, naturalised in Mexico in 2002, and with no previous criminal record, Mr Ye Gon said he had lost $126m in Las Vegas’ casinos, but as a valued customer, had been given back 40 per cent of his losses, plus gifts of luxury cars.

叶真理在被捕后不久解释了自己对赌博的痴迷。叶真理1963生于上海，2002年加入墨西哥国籍，之前没有犯罪记录。叶真理称，他在拉斯维加斯的赌场输掉了1.26亿美元，但作为一名重要客户，赌场向他退回了40%的损失，还送了豪华车作为礼物。

Although Mr Ye Gon denies all charges, the story of his casino trips offers some insight into one way in which suitcases of money can be laundered. A gambler with dirty money can buy millions of dollars of casino chips and then recoup some of the losses in legitimate cheques and cars.

尽管叶真理否认所有指控，但他频频光顾赌场的故事，让人一瞥洗白整箱现金的方式之一。一名携带“脏钱的赌徒，可以购买数百万美元赌场筹码，然后通过合法支票和汽车挽回部分损失。

In the rinse and spin of money cleaning, HSBC was simply one washing machine among many. As Antonio Maria Costa, the former head of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), says: “Today I cannot think of one bank in the world that has not been penetrated by mafia money.

在漂洗金钱的活动中，汇丰只是众多“洗钱机中的一个。联合国毒品控制和犯罪预防办公室(UNODC)前执行主任安东尼奥·玛丽·科斯塔(Antonio Maria Costa)表示：“今天，在世界各地的银行中，我想不起来有哪一家没有被黑社会资金所渗透。

The global trade in illicit drugs is huge. The UNODC estimates it is worth $380bn in 2010 dollars, about 10 times the annual sales of online retailer Amazon. Indeed, it was because of international drug trafficking that money laundering first vaulted on to the agenda of international crime fighters.

全球非法毒品交易规模巨大。UNDOC估计，2010年毒品交易规模价值3800亿美元，大约是网络零售商亚马逊(Amazon)年销售额的10倍。的确，当初正是为了要遏制国际贩毒活动，洗钱才登上国际打击犯罪机构的议程。

The creation of the Financial Action Task Force in 1989 pooled the G7 group of industrial nations’ money-laundering expertise. The initiative gained real urgency after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. “Like it or not, a US justice official then told a gathering of US bankers, “you are going to be on the front line of the coming war on terrorism.

1989年成立的金融行动特别工作组(Financial Action Task Force)汇集了七国集团(G7)工业国家的反洗钱专家。2001年9/11恐怖袭击之后，这项倡议才真正变得迫切起来。当时一名美国司法官员在一次银行家聚会上表示：“不管你喜欢与否，你们都要走上即将开始的反恐战争的前线。

Yet the impact of this financial war appears limited – so far. Given that the illicit drugs business is blurred and all its numbers are prone to exaggeration, any assessment is difficult. What is clear, though, is that the vast majority of its profits are earned in drug-consuming nations, where the money trail begins.

但这场金融战争的影响似乎有限——至少迄今影响不大。考虑到非法毒品生意的界限很模糊，其数据容易被夸大，因此难以评估。不过清楚的是，绝大部分利润来自毒品消费国，这是资金链的开端。

Take the $35bn a year US cocaine market. Only 1.5 per cent of its proceeds accrue to coca-leaf producing peasants in the Andes. International traffickers get about 13 per cent. The vast bulk, about 85 per cent, is earned by distributors in the US. (European figures are similar.) It is the inadvertent washing of these dirty dollars that HSBC was accused of.

以美国每年350亿美元的可卡因市场为例。只有1.5%的所得归种植古柯叶的安第斯山脉农民所有。国际走私贩拿走13%左右。大部分所得（约85%）落入美国境内的分销商囊中（欧洲的数据类似）。汇丰被指控的正是在不经意间洗白了这种“脏钱。

Money laundering is a three step process: drugs are sold, the money “cleaned of its illegal origins, and then deposited somewhere in the global financial system. From the testimonies of convicted drug kingpins, Mexican authorities believe it has typically worked something like this.

洗钱分为三步：出售毒品，“洗去资金的非法来源，然后把资金存到全球金融体系的某处。从被判罪名成立的毒枭的证词来看，墨西哥当局相信洗钱过程通常是这样的。

Cocaine cargoes are dispatched from Latin America, say, to Atlanta, where they are sold wholesale to US-based retailers. The wholesalers are paid in cash, typically $10 and $20 bills, which they truck south to border towns, such as El Paso. Drivers charge between 6 and 8 per cent, depending on the distance and load.

夹杂可卡因的货物从拉丁美洲发运到（比如）亚特兰大，在这里被批发给美国境内的零售商。批发商获得现金，通常是10美元或者20美元的小额钞票，他们托人把钞票运到德克萨斯州埃尔巴索等边境城镇。司机按照距离和载重，收取6%至8%的佣金。

The money is then changed into handier $100 bills and filtered across the border, to be fed into classic front businesses – cash-intensive operations such as restaurants – or swapped at exchange houses for pesos. The rinsed dollars are then bought by banks, such as HSBC, from where they can be wired anywhere in the world.

然后，这些钞票被兑换成更为便携的100美元钞票，流出边境，流入经典的“门面企业（餐厅等资金密集型生意），或者在外汇交易所兑换成比索。然后，汇丰等银行接受洗白的资金，这些资金便可以从银行电汇到世界任何角落。

HSBC Mexico was well-placed to hoover up those dollars. At one point after its $1.1bn acquisition of Grupo Financiero Bital in 2002, the bank had more branches in Mexico than in the UK. Yet all of the last stages of this process are legal, even if suspicious. Furthermore, they are camouflaged by larger legitimate money flows.

汇丰墨西哥分行在吸纳这些资金方面处于有利地位。在汇丰2002年斥资11亿美元收购墨西哥银行Grupo Financiero Bital之后，其在墨西哥的分行数量一度超过英国。然而，这一过程的最后几步是合法的，即便可疑。此外，更大规模的合法资金流掩护了这些操作。

The Senate report found that HSBC transferred $7bn to its US holding through 2007 and 2010. It seems some of those transfers may even then have been illegal drug trade proceeds. Yet, by comparison, daily turnover in Mexico’s currency markets is $50bn.

美国参议院的报告发现，2007至2010年间，汇丰向其美国控股公司转移了70亿美元。这些转移的资金中，部分似乎在当时还属于非法毒品交易收入。然而，相比之下，墨西哥货币市场的日交易量为500亿美元。

Officials are often, therefore, looking for the proverbial needle in the haystack. Their search is further complicated by cunning new practices, such as cleaning dirty dollars via prepaid store cards, a business worth some $550bn a year; or the purchase of legal goods – such as tomatoes or bolts of fabric – which are then legitimately transported across borders.

因此，官员们常常像大海捞针一样。而他们的搜索又被狡诈的新手法搅得更加复杂。例如，罪犯通过预付的商店礼品卡来漂白“脏钱，这种生意每年价值约5500亿美元；或者用“脏钱购买合法商品（如番茄或者大量布料），然后把这些商品合法运送出边境。

Money laundering, like drug trafficking, is also something of a vicious circle: bulky dollar bills are often reconverted into handy packets of cocaine, the drugs thereby concealing money rather than the reverse. Another characteristic of the business: someone else is always to blame.

正如走私毒品一样，洗钱也是一种恶性循环：大把美钞往往被再次换成了便携的小袋可卡因，因此，毒品隐藏了货币，而非相反。这种生意的另一个特点是，总能找到指责对象。

During the Washington hearing, there was some tacit finger-pointing at London – even though the scale of HSBC’s wrongdoing pales next to Wachovia’s. Like HSBC, the US bank did not have rigorous systems. As a result some $373bn in wire transfers, versus HSBC’s $7bn, were made from 2004 to 2007. More than $4bn in bulk cash was also transported from Mexican banks to Wachovia accounts. Bought in 2010 by Wells Fargo, Wachovia has since paid $160m to settle charges, and nobody in the US has gone to jail (versus 15 in Mexico).

在华盛顿举行听证会期间，伦敦有人在含蓄指责——尽管同美联银行(Wachovia)相比，汇丰的不当行为相形见绌。与汇丰一样，这家美国银行没有严格的制度。结果，2004-2007年间，其电汇规模高达3730亿美元左右，而汇丰为70亿美元。逾40亿美元的巨额现金从墨西哥的银行转移到美联银行的账户。2010年富国银行(Wells Fargo)收购美联银行以后，美联银行前后花了1.6亿美元，就各项刑事指控达成和解，美国无一人坐牢（相比之下墨西哥有15人入狱）。

HSBC passed the buck. At the hearing, Paul Thurston, head of retail and wealth management, blamed the bank’s lapses on Mexico’s “challenging environment, including the kidnapping, extortion and bribery risks his staff faced. While that might have been true of a branch manager in a violent border city, it was surely not a threat faced by staff in Mexico City. Mr Thurston’s was “an easy escape attempt, says one Mexican official.

汇丰推卸责任。在听证会上，零售与财富管理业务主管保罗·瑟斯顿(Paul Thurston)把汇丰的错误归咎于墨西哥“挑战性的环境，包括其员工面临的绑架、勒索和贿赂风险。事实上，一座暴力泛滥的边境城市的分行经理或许置身于这样的处境，但墨西哥城的员工肯定不会面临这样的威胁。墨西哥的一名官员表示，瑟斯顿是在“避重就轻推卸责任。

But Mexicans also find scapegoats. There have been 50,000 deaths since the government began an offensive on organised crime six years ago. Many Mexicans say the offensive is one where “Mexico supplies the deaths, and the US keeps the dollars and supplies the guns. Yet it is also true that Mexico provides the assassins.

但墨西哥人也找到了替罪羊推卸责任。自6年前政府开始打击有组织犯罪以来，已经有5万人死亡。很多墨西哥人表示，这场打击中“死的是墨西哥人，捞钱和提供枪支的是美国人。不过同样属实的是，杀手都是墨西哥人。

The HSBC case has renewed hopes that the fight against organised crime can be won using “ninja accountants who will drain its lifeblood with spreadsheets – as happened to Al Capone, who was imprisoned on tax evasion charges. Yet that is doubtful.

汇丰案件使人们重燃希望：打击有组织犯罪可以借助为电子表格殚精竭虑的“忍者会计师获胜——正如因被控逃税而入狱的阿尔·卡彭(A. Capone)的遭遇那样。但这种希望令人怀疑。

Dirty money will always find a weak spot to enter the global financial system – be that opaque countries such as Russia or others that use the US dollar, such as Ecuador. Even in supposedly sophisticated countries the record is poor. In 2010, Federal Asset Seizures totalled just $2.5bn, a fraction of the US’s estimated $65bn annual illegal drugs market. In the UK in 2010/2010, the Serious Organised Crime Agency seized criminal assets worth ￡318m.

无论是在俄罗斯等不透明的国家还是厄瓜多尔等使用美元的国家，“脏钱总能找到进入全球金融体系的弱点。即使在号称先进的国家，记录也相当糟糕。2010年，联邦资产扣押令(Federal Asset Seizures)总计仅没收了25亿美元，只占估计年度价值650亿美元的美国非法毒品市场的一小部分。2010和2010年，英国重大有组织犯罪署(SOCA)没收了价值3.18亿英镑的犯罪资产。

Money-laundering investigations are also slow-moving. Even with HSBC’s full co-operation, the probe took five years. Also, tighter bank regulation and better compliance – HSBC for example says it has doubled spending on compliance and now has 3,500 people on the task – have pushed money-washing into non-financial companies. These are more numerous and harder to monitor.

洗钱调查也行动迟缓。即使在汇丰的全面配合下，美方的调查也花了5年之久。此外，银行监管更加严格，合规进一步加强（例如，汇丰表示合规支出翻番，现在合规人员达3500人），已推动洗钱进入非金融企业。这样的企业数量更多，更加难以监控。

Estimating the scale of money-laundering is almost impossible. The UN reckons global criminal proceeds total $870bn annually. That is a huge number but, seen in the context of annual global trade of $18tn, or daily foreign exchange turnover of $4tn, it can easily be overlooked. Like a sucker fish riding on a whale, criminal commerce, including money-laundering, is submerged, discreet, usually in cash and hard to capture as it can just swim off somewhere else.

估计洗钱的规模几乎是不可能的。联合国(UN)承认，每年全球犯罪收入总计达8700亿美元。这一数字非常庞大，但与全球每年18万亿美元的贸易额，或者每天4万亿美元的外汇交易相比，就很容易被忽视了。正如吸附在鲸鱼身上的亚口鱼一样，犯罪商业（包括洗钱）伏在水下、小心谨慎，通常用现金交易，而且难以捕捉，因为它能够轻易游到其他地方。