FT社评：希腊经济忧中带喜

The late-summer diplomacy over Greece is so far having less impact on the country’s future in the eurozone than its economic situation, which continues to change – mostly for the worse, but also in ways that may defy the sceptics.

迄今为止，今年夏末针对希腊问题的外交努力对于该国是否会留在欧元区的影响，比不上该国经济形势对它去留的影响。希腊经济形势还在继续变化——基本上是朝着更糟糕的方向发展，但也有一些会让怀疑者们感到惊讶的发展。

Antonis Samaras, the Greek prime minister, last week met with German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Fran ois Hollande. They reiterated their broad support for Greece’s place within the single currency, but offered no help beyond the current rescue programme. In particular, they declined – for now – to grant Mr Samaras’s request to stretch out remaining austerity measures over four years instead of two.

希腊总理安东尼斯·萨马拉斯(Antonis Samaras)上周与德国总理安格拉·默克尔(Angela Merkel)和法国总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德(Fran ois Hollande)进行了会晤。默克尔和奥朗德再次明确表示支持希腊留在欧元区，但没有提供除现有纾困计划以外的更多帮助。尤其是，就目前而言，他们仍不同意萨马拉斯提出的“把完成剩余紧缩措施的期限由两年延长至四年的请求。

This was predictable. Berlin (if not the Bundesbank) and Paris have aligned themselves with the European Central Bank’s preparations to intervene in government bond markets and are well advised to see how that plays out before their next move. Offering Athens anything before the creditor troika finishes its assessment this autumn is politically impossible at home and tactically unwise vis a vis Mr Samaras’s government. If Athens shows it means business, however, the extension should be granted but with no extra funding.

这一结果在人们的预料之中。德国政府（如果不是德国央行(Bundesbank)的话）和法国政府支持欧洲央行(ECB)为干预政府债券市场所做的准备，并已打定主意要视干预行动的效果决定下一步怎么走。在今年秋天三大债权人完成评估之前向希腊做出任何承诺，不但就国内而言在政治上无法交代，而且就与萨马拉斯政府打交道而言也不是明智的策略。然而，如果希腊政府表现出它是当真的，那么我们应当同意其延长紧缩措施完成时限，但不必给予额外的资金支持。

As the wheels of diplomacy whirr on, the cogs of the Greek economy are grinding out a new reality. Austerity and a European slowdown have depressed the economy and kept pushing headline deficit goals out of reach. But Athens has done more than many think. Unit labour costs are falling and the primary deficit – before debt service costs – is almost gone.

在外交车轮继续前行之际，希腊经济的齿轮也正艰难地“咬合出一片新天地。紧缩措施与欧洲经济增长放缓打击了希腊经济，也令该国总体减赤目标无望实现。但希腊政府做出的努力超越了许多人的想象。单位劳动力成本正在下降，基本赤字（不计入偿债成本）已几乎清零。

The politics of the rescue will change markedly if Athens reaches primary balance soon. It will not need help to pay wages and pensions; rescue money will only fund payments to creditors. A funding cut-off would be less devastating than earlier. It would lead to a forced restructuring, to be sure, but would be less traumatising than with a big funding gap.

如果希腊能很快达到基本收支平衡的话，那么对希腊的纾困策略将发生很大的变化。希腊将不需要援助就能支付得起工资和养老金；纾困资金将仅仅用于帮助其偿还债务。切断纾困资金的破坏性将不像先前那样严重。当然，切断纾困资金可能迫使希腊进行债务重组，但不会造成一个更严重的后果，也就是出现巨大的资金缺口。

Crucially, default need not lead to an exit from the euro. Once the ongoing recapitalisation of Greek banks is complete, and especially if the eurozone makes headway on banking union, there will be nothing for Athens to gain from an exit even in case of default.

最关键的是，希腊出现债务违约不一定导致其退出欧元区。目前正在进行的银行业资本重组一旦完成，尤其是如果欧元区建立银行业联盟的努力取得了进展的话，希腊即便出现债务违约，也不会从退出欧元区中得到任何好处。

While the private sector would face a difficult adjustment, a realistic worst case could be a situation like Montenegro’s, where the economy operates entirely in euros though it is not a eurozone member. That would be humiliating enough, and Greece should aim for better. But a new drachma may be less likely than markets think.

尽管希腊私人部门将面临一次艰难的调整，但这不是最糟的情况。有可能会出现的一个最糟糕的情况是，变成另一个黑山共和国(Montenegro)：虽然不是欧元区成员国，但该国在经济活动中完全使用欧元。这种情况真够丢脸，而希腊应当力争避免步其后尘。希腊重启德拉克马(drachma)的可能性，或许没有市场估计的那样高。