微妙时刻的权力交接

The faces of the seven ageing men in dark suits were new, but the script they followed as they walked stiffly on to the stage in the Great Hall of the People was little changed from that of their predecessors a decade earlier.

那七位身着黑色西装、上了年纪的男士虽说是新面孔，但当他们拘谨地走上人民大会堂的舞台时，一举一动都按照与10年前他们的前任们几乎一样的剧本。

China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, introduced the newly minted members of the Communist party’s Politburo Standing Committee in turn, they bowed and applauded each other and then, after a short speech by Mr Xi, filed out to begin governing the world’s most populous nation.

中国新领导人习近平依次介绍了这些新出炉的中共中央政治局常委，他们则鞠躬并互相鼓掌。接着，在习近平发表了一段简短的讲话之后，他们鱼贯走下舞台，他们在世界第一人口大国的执政就此开始。

The rituals of the Communist party have barely changed in the past 10 years and its leaders are still chosen behind closed doors by a tiny clique of party elders.

中共的这套仪式十年来几乎没怎么变过，而中共的领导人仍然是由党内元老组成的小集团秘密挑选出来的。

But the country it reigns over has been transformed since the last leadership transition and the challenges it faces in perpetuating its rule are mounting. Mr Xi acknowledged as much in Beijing yesterday during an address that was unusually plain-spoken and bereft of communist jargon.

但是中国的情况自上次换届以来已经发生了变化，中共要维持长久统治面临着越来越大的挑战。习近平昨日在北京的讲话中同样承认了这一点。这次讲话异常坦率，并且很少出现中共官员惯用的口号。

“Our party faces many severe challenges and there are many pressing problems within the party that need to be resolved, Mr Xi said. “We must make every effort to solve these problems; the whole party must stay on full alert.

习近平在讲话中表示：“我们党面临着许多严峻挑战，党内存在着许多亟待解决的问题。……必须下大气力解决。全党必须警醒起来。

If the seven new leaders needed any evidence that, offstage, the world had changed around them over the past decade, it came in the form of Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter. Puncturing the fusty decorum of the politburo, cheeky commentators mocked the party elite over their speaking styles and accused them of being an hour late because they were getting their make-up done.

如果七位领导人需要任何证据证明10年来周边世界已经发生了变化，只要看看中国的“推特(Twitter)——微博(Weibo)——就行了。一些评论者把矛头直指政治局的古板作风，无所顾忌地拿常委们的讲话风格取笑，说他们推迟一小时露面是因为要化妆。

China’s new leaders rose to power when uncomfortable facts could be reliably kept out of public view, as happened with outbreaks of Sars and Aids. But their fossilised political apparatus will struggle to contend with a more critical and confrontational public discourse. This was illustrated last year when comments on Weibo from witnesses of a high-speed rail crash forced China’s authorities into direct action. This would not have been possible a decade ago.

在中国新领导层上台之时，有关方面能够可靠地把那些令人难堪的事情排除在公众视野之外，就像当年“非典(Sars)和艾滋病(Aids)爆发时的情况一样。不过，他们僵化的政治体制将难以应对越发具有批判性和对抗性的公众舆论。这一点在去年的动车事故中显露无遗，当时微博上目击者的评论迫使当局采取了直接行动。这在十年前是不可能发生的。

Passing the flower

击鼓传花

In fact, public defiance is increasing. Sun Liping, a professor from the elite Tsinghua University who is said to have supervised Mr Xi’s doctorate, estimates there were more than 180,000 public demonstrations in 2010, compared with an official estimate of about 40,000 in 2002.

实际上，公众的抵触情绪正在加深。据清华大学教授孙立平估计，2010年全国发生18万多起群体事件，而在2002年官方估计为4万起左右。孙立平据说在习近平读博士时指导过他。

The response from the previous administration was to ramp up the budget for domestic security and “stability maintenance – and to crack down on anyone who was seen as threatening the status quo.

上届政府对此的反应是增加国内安全预算，加大“维稳力度，也就是对任何被视为会威胁到现状的人进行压制。

“I would characterise the last five years, and especially since 2010, as a period of authoritarian stagnation in which all political, social and economic reforms were stillborn, says David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Programme at George Washington University. “I’m afraid we’re going to get more of that under Xi.

乔治华盛顿大学(George Washington University)中国政策研究项目(China Policy Programme)主任沈大伟(David Shambaugh)表示：“对于中国最近五年，特别是2010年以来的这段时期，我认为其特征是威权体制下的停滞时期，所有政治、社会及经济改革都流产了。我恐怕在习近平执政时期这种情况将会持续。

The outgoing administration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao can rightfully claim to have presided over one of the most flourishing periods in Chinese history: a decade of double-digit growth and a corresponding rise in China’s global standing. China’s gross domestic product is almost five times larger than it was 10 years ago and it has gone from being the world’s sixth-largest economy to the second-largest.

即将交班的中国国家主席胡锦涛和国务院总理温家宝可以理直气壮地声称，他们执政的时期是中国历史上最繁荣的时期之一：10年来中国经济保持了双位数增长，中国的国际地位也相应大幅度提升；中国国内生产总值(GDP)差不多是10年前的五倍，而且中国从世界第六大经济体上升为第二大经济体。

Over the same period, the country’s foreign exchange reserves jumped from $287bn to $3.3tn, the number of Chinese tourists travelling abroad each year increased from less than 17m to more than 70m and the length of the national highway network more than doubled.

在这一时期，中国外汇储备从2870亿美元跃升到3.3万亿美元，中国年出境游人数从不到1700万增加到7000万以上，而全国公路里程增加了一倍以上。

But the most common assessment from Chinese policy makers, intellectuals and officials is that Mr Hu and Mr Wen presided over a “lost decade during which they reaped the benefits of smart decisions made by their predecessors but failed to outline or implement a viable vision for the future. The Chinese quip that they engaged in “jigu chuanhua – literally “beating the drum and passing the flower – a traditional Chinese game like pass the parcel or musical chairs.

然而，中国政策制定者、学者及官员中最常见的评价却是，胡温执政期间中国经历了“失落的十年，他们收割了前任们英明决策的果实，却未能为中国未来勾勒出一幅可行的愿景。民众揶揄他们在玩“击鼓传花游戏，这是一种类似于西方“传包裹或“抢椅子游戏的中国传统游戏。

“During their 10 years in power, Hu and Wen relied entirely on the fruits of the investment and development of the previous 13 years [before they took over in 2002], says Ma Xiaolin, a prominent political commentator and founder of an online discussion forum. “But now in the Xi [Jinping] era, if the leadership cannot solve the major problems, such as serious corruption and problems in the judiciary, then they will definitely not be able to maintain social or political stability.

著名政治评论员、一家在线论坛的创立者马晓霖表示：“胡温执政的十年完全依赖于之前13年投资与发展的果实。如今在习（近平）时代，如果中国领导人不能解决各种重大问题，如腐败猖獗及司法中的问题，他们必然无法维持社会与政治稳定。

Losing steam

经济减速

China’s quarterly year-on-year growth rate has dropped from 12 per cent at the start of 2010 to about 7.5 per cent now and the country is on track to register its slowest full-year growth since 1999.

中国的季度经济增长同比出现下滑，从2010年初的12%降至目前的7.5%左右。中国今年的全年经济增长率可能创下自1999年以来的最低水平。

With the growth model running out of steam, the country’s new leaders do not have the luxury of an economic boom like that enjoyed by their predecessors.

随着增长模式丧失发展势头，中国新一届领导人无法像他们的前任一样享受经济的高速增长。

“We’ve seen very quick growth for almost 30 years but now we have come to a crossroads, says Mao Yushi, an influential liberal economist.

颇具影响力的自由派经济学家茅于轼表示：“中国经济已经有了近30年的飞速发展，但现在我们走到了十字路口。

“The [outgoing] administration didn’t push reforms, the force of earlier reforms has been used up and we see mounting problems stemming from the political dictatorship.

“（即将卸任的）本届政府没有推动改革，较早时期的改革动力已经耗尽，我们看到威权政治导致了越来越多的问题。

Mr Hu came into office with a promise to narrow a widening gap between rich and poor and shift to a more environmentally and economically sustainable growth model.

胡锦涛上任伊始承诺缩小贫富差距，转向环境和经济更可持续的增长模式。

The government did make some progress in building a rudimentary social welfare system. Chinese growth is now less reliant on exports but environmental degradation is a source of serious social unrest. Inequality has worsened considerably.

本届政府的确在建立基本社会福利体系方面取得了一些成就。中国经济增长目前降低了对出口的依赖，但环境退化引发了严重的社会骚乱。社会不平等严重加深。

The demographic dividend that has fuelled China’s double-digit growth for decades with a seemingly endless stream of cheap, pliant labour is now coming to an end.

得益于人口红利，中国在过去几十年实现了两位数的增长，拥有似乎源源不断的廉价顺从的劳动力，但目前这种红利趋于结束。

During Mr Xi’s first five-year term, the Chinese labour force is forecast to peak and start shrinking. Over the longer term, the average age of the Chinese populace will rise rapidly, thanks largely to the one-child policy.

在习近平的第一个5年任期，预计中国劳动力人口将达到峰值并开始下降。在长期，中国人口平均年龄将迅速上升，这很大程度上归因于中国的独生子女政策。

At the same time, a huge boom in investment, the bulk of which went into the export sector and property, is increasingly unsustainable, according to Beijing’s own estimates.

与此同时，根据中国政府自己的估计，大举投资的模式越来越不可持续。中国大部分投资都流向了出口行业和房地产领域。

The party is intent on shifting China’s growth model away from exports and investment towards domestic consumer demand. Mr Xi is likely to make this a focus of his economic policy.

中共打算将增长模式从出口和投资转向内需。习近平可能以此作为其经济政策的重点。

This will mean placing a continued emphasis on expanding the country’s woefully inadequate social services and a slew of policies aimed at boosting the country’s weak service industries. It will also involve taking on powerful constituents in the state sector, where the Hu administration oversaw a resurgence that is popularly referred to as “guojin mintui, or “the state advances and the private sector recedes.

这将意味着中国将会继续把重点放在发展严重不足的社会服务上，并出台一系列旨在提升落后服务业的政策。这还意味着要与强大的国有部门较量。胡锦涛领导的政府促进了国企复兴，而这被广泛称为“国进民退。

“If you look at the next 10 to 15 years, China has huge potential to grow and huge scope to increase its GDP, says Mr Mao.

茅于轼表示：“如果你研究一下未来10年至15年，就会发现中国有巨大的增长潜力，也有提高GDP的巨大空间。

“But we still have too many state-owned enterprises and monopoly industries controlled by the state; these are very inefficient and are limiting the growth potential.

“但我们仍有太多的国有企业和政府控制的垄断行业；这些行业效率极为低下，限制了经济增长潜力。

The private sector in China has been the main driver of growth and the biggest creator of jobs since the country began to dabble with capitalism in the early 1980s.

自上世纪80年代初中国开始试水市场经济以来，私营部门一直是增长的主要推动力，也是创造就业最多的领域。

Many Chinese economists agree with Mr Mao that the state companies must be reined in for growth to continue.

许多中国经济学家赞同茅于轼的观点，即要想持续增长，就必须抑制国有企业。

This will be a key problem for Mr Xi and will test his willingness to tackle entrenched vested interests that oppose economic and political reforms.

这将是习近平面临的关键问题，也将考验他是否愿意打破根深蒂固的既得利益。这些利益集团反对经济和政治改革。

“I’m dubious that the new government will be able to do much on state-owned enterprise reform or any other major reforms, says Prof Shambaugh. “Even if they really want to reform they will find themselves blocked by four groups of very powerful institutional interests – the state enterprises themselves, the military, the apparatchiks and the state security apparatus.

沈大伟表示：“我怀疑新一届政府能否大力推行国企改革，或其他任何重大改革。即便他们真的想改革，也会发现自己受到四个非常强势的利益集团的阻扰——国企自身、军方、中共官僚和国家安全机构。

Many Chinese and international analysts say the increased power of these entrenched groups has caused stagnation, which in turn is aggravating some classic symptoms of late-

许多中国和国际分析人士表示，这些利益集团权势日益增长，导致发展停滞，而这种停滞又反过来，加重了曾出现在中国旧没落王朝的一些典型病症。

regime dynastic decline in China.

其中一个症状是中共高层的派系主义，今年薄熙来的倒台就证明了这一点，他曾是政治抱负极强的高官。

One of these signs is factionalism at the top of the party, evidence for which came this year with the downfall of former political high-flyer Bo Xilai.

薄熙来目前正等待审判，他的指控涉及腐败，以及他的妻子去年11月谋杀英国商人尼尔·海伍德(Neil Heywood)。就在今年3月以前，薄熙来还被视为有望在本周召开的十八大会议上升任政治局常委的热门人眩

Mr Bo is awaiting trial on charges related to corruption and his wife’s murder of British businessman Neil Heywood last November. Until March he was seen as a frontrunner to ascend into the Politburo Standing Committee at this week’s Communist party congress.

目前很难找到确切数据，但中国资本外流，以及受过良好教育的富人的外流似乎在加速，同时各级政府腐败日益猖獗。

Accurate figures are hard to find but the outflow of capital and wealthy, well-educated people from China appears to be gathering pace, while rampant corruption pervades every level of government.

中共要想避免其他未能引领社会变革的威权政权的命运，习近平及其班子将必须实施比其前任更为积极的政策纲领。

Mr Xi and his incoming team will have to implement a much more active policy agenda than their predecessors if the party is to avoid the fate of other authoritarian regimes that failed to keep ahead of societal demands for change.

随着互联网（尤其是新浪微博等微型博客）的兴起，中共满足社会变革要求的能力显得不足。互联网传播信息的速度远远超过了政府审查的速度。

The party’s ability to meet those demands is hampered because of the rise of the internet – and in particular microblogs such as Weibo – which spread information much faster than the government can censor it.

2002年，胡锦涛上任时，中国的互联网用户不到6千万，如今，网民已逾5亿。

The number of internet users in China has increased from less than 60m in 2002, when Mr Hu came to power, to well over 500m today.

这对中共构成巨大挑战。中共迫切希望推动高科技创新，实现现代化，但同时又以铁腕手段控制从美术、戏剧到报纸和电视的一切公共表达方式。

This presents an enormous challenge to a party that desperately wants to promote high-tech innovation and modernity but has always maintained an iron grip on all forms of public expression, from fine art and theatre to newspapers and television.

中山大学(Sun Yat-sen University)政治学教授郭巍青表示：“大众正在创造性地使用互联网收集信息、相互交流以及动员。

“The general public is using the internet in a creative way to gather information, communicate with each other and also to mobilise, says Guo Weiqing, a professor of politics at Sun Yat-sen University.

正统马克思主义

Marxist orthodoxy

在这个信息流动更加自由的时代，国家意识形态显得十分空洞，即使在中共党内，也广受嘲讽。中国的国家意识形态建立在“马克思列宁主义、“毛泽东思想，以及类似胡锦涛“科学发展观的连贯性较弱的理论基础上。

In this era of more free-flowing information, state ideology, based on “Marxism-Leninism, “Mao Zedong Thought and a porridge of less coherent theories such as Mr Hu’s “Scientific Outlook on Development, rings hollow and is widely ridiculed, even within the party ranks.

习近平一直表现为正统的马克思主义者，但多数政治分析人士认为，他必须为自己和中共重新定位，勾画出能够引起更多人共鸣的未来前景。

Mr Xi has presented himself as an orthodox Marxist but most political analysts believe he will need to reposition himself, and the party, to present a vision of the future that more people can relate to.

令中共担忧的另一个迹象是，军方日益强硬，文职领导层似乎难以完全驾驭军队。

Another worrying sign for the party is the rise of an assertive military that does not appear to be under the full control of the civilian leadership.

这对世界其他国家产生了重大影响，尤其是中国的邻国。这些国家日益警惕地看待中国，因为中国官方军费预算已从2002年的1710亿元人民币增长到去年的6030亿元人民币。

This has enormous implications for the rest of the world, in particular China’s increasingly wary neighbours who have seen Beijing’s official military budget expand from Rmb171bn in 2002 to Rmb603bn last year.

美国智库“传统基金会(Heritage Foundation)的史剑道(Derek Scissors)和成斌(Dean Cheng)表示：“从韩国和日本，沿着第一岛链向西直到印度，中国日益被当作对手和潜在的敌人。

“From South Korea and Japan, along the entire first island chain, and westwards to India, China is increasingly seen as an antagonist and potential adversary, say Derek Scissors and Dean Cheng of The Heritage Foundation, a US think-tank.

研究中国问题的专家表示，胡锦涛在对外政策上的最大成就是缓和了同台湾的紧张关系。台湾是一座实行自治的岛屿，北京方面一直声称拥有台湾的领土主权。

Chinese experts say Mr Hu’s biggest foreign-policy achievement was reducing tensions with Taiwan, the self-ruled island nation that Beijing claims as its sovereign territory.

在南中国海和中国东海地区，中国的言辞愈加强硬，动作愈加咄咄逼人，这让该地区其他国家对中国宝贵的友好态度所剩无几。在这些海域的部分地区，蕴藏丰富的渔业资源和能源储备。

But a ratcheting up of rhetoric and aggressive action over territory in the South China Sea and East China Sea – some of it rich in fish stocks and energy reserves – have left Beijing with precious little goodwill from the rest of the region

中国人民大学美国研究中心主任时殷弘表示：“（2002年）胡锦涛上台之际，中国不需要找俄罗斯或其他国家交朋友，因为中国与邻国的关系相当融洽，但现在关系则十分紧张。发生军事冲突的可能性仍然很小，但在过去40年中，我从来没有听过这么多（中国）人认真地谈论爆发战争。

“When Hu Jintao took over [in 2002] China didn’t need to look to Russia or elsewhere to make friends because relations with its neighbours were quite good but now relations are really terrible, says Shi Yinhong, director of the Center for American studies at Renmin University. “A military conflict is still a very remote possibility but for the past 40 years I’ve never heard so many people [in China] talking seriously about going to war.

习近平的父亲是革命军政领导人、中共创始元勋之一。部分分析人士希望，习近平的这种身份能让他驯服军方，制定外交政策议程时也不再那么生硬粗暴。

Some analysts hope Mr Xi’s status as the “princeling son of a revolutionary commander and founding member of the Communist party will allow him to bring the military to heel and present a foreign-policy agenda that is less abrasive.

但其他人质疑，习近平是否真的想这么做。

But others question whether that is something he really wants.

哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)中国政治教授、《中国的新统治者》(China’s New Rulers)的合著者黎安友(Andrew Nathan)表示：“中国领导人总是把美国当成纸老虎，认为如果他们对邻国和华盛顿表现强硬，就能迫使所有人后退。

“Chinese leaders tend to think of the US as a paper tiger and believe if they show they’re tough on their neighbours and on Washington then that will force everyone to back down, says Andrew Nathan, a professor of Chinese politics at Columbia University and co-author of “China’s New Rulers.

他补充道：“我认为，习近平将奉行的一项外交政策是，继续在国际舞台上展现更加自信的中国。

“On foreign policy I expect Xi to continue a policy of promoting a more assertive China on the world stage, he adds.

铸造和谐

Forging harmony

多数分析人士认为，习近平与其前任的最大区别是姿态，而非实质。

Most analysts believe the biggest difference between Mr Xi and his predecessor will be one of style rather than substance.

习近平讲话时不像胡锦涛那么依赖稿子，也比胡更加自信。他的样子亲切友善，能让他在难以驾驭的中国精英政治世界中建立共识。

Mr Xi is less scripted and more confident than Mr Hu and his affable style allows him to build consensus in the fractious world of elite Chinese politics.

昨天，他讲话坦诚，强调了中共党内存在的腐败问题，却很少提及社会主义或任何正统的意识形态方面的词汇。

He spoke frankly yesterday, highlighted corruption while barely mentioning socialism or any other orthodox ideological phrases.

但他是否有能力、甚至是否愿意推动亟需的经济和政治改革，还有待检验。多数学者对此相当悲观。

But his ability, or even his desire, to push much-needed economic and political reforms remains completely untested, and most pundits are quite pessimistic.

普林斯顿大学(Princeton University)东亚研究名誉教授林培瑞(Perry Link)表示：“如果认为中国的新一届领导人能够制定更宏大的改革蓝图，而不只是对来自下面的要求做出被动反应，那就太愚蠢了。认为习近平是中国的戈尔巴乔夫(Gorbachev)是没有任何根据的。

“It’s silly to expect China’s new leaders to come up with a reformist blueprint that will be anything other than a reactive attempt to stay on top of demands from below, says Perry Link, emeritus professor of East Asia studies at Princeton University. “There is no reason at all to think that Xi is going to be the Gorbachev of China.