欧洲应重新审视会计准则

In recent days, the Bank of England has called for banks to produce more prudent accounts. It is worried that banks’ failure to recognise likely defaults – associated with so-called zombie companies – is holding back lending, and thus growth. Hewlett-Packard’s decision to write off 80 per cent of the value of its 2011 acquisition of Autonomy, the UK software company, highlights the vital role of robust accounts outside the banking sector. We, along with other investors, believe that prudence needs to be restored to accounting in all companies if we are to have confidence in the numbers and to support sustained economic growth.

英国央行(Bank of England)最近呼吁各银行编制更审慎的会计报表，该行担心，银行未能识别可能的违约——与所谓的僵尸企业(zombie companies)有关——会阻碍贷款活动，进而影响经济增长。惠普(HP)决定将其2011年收购的英国软件公司Autonomy的资产价值减记80%，突显出在非银行业领域稳健报表的重要作用。我们和其他投资者认为，如果想让我们相信报表上的数据并为经济的持续增长提供支持，审慎原则需要重新回到所有公司的报表上来。

As long-term shareholders, we depend on accounts to provide a reliable view of a company’s capital, to evaluate the performance of executives and to give managements incentives to create enduring value. Directors require prudent accounts to fulfil their legal responsibilities: to determine that a company is solvent and how much money can be distributed to shareholders without eating into capital.

作为长期股东，我们依赖会计报表提供有关一家公司资本状况的可靠意见、评估高管表现以及给予管理层创造持久价值的激励。公司董事需要审慎的报表来履行其法律责任：确定一家公司具备偿付能力，并确定在不侵蚀资本金的情况下，有多少资金可以分配给股东。

To achieve this, accounts must emphasise realisable values and incorporate likely losses. They should provide a “true and fair view of a business, not exaggerated by shortlived market fluctuations.

要做到这点，会计报表必须着眼于可变现价值，并纳入可能的亏损。它们应提供有关一家公司的“真实和公允意见，这种意见不会因为短期市场波动而被夸大。

The imposition of International Financial Reporting Standards in Europe in 2005 – and in particular the prioritisation of “neutrality over “prudence – has cast accounts adrift from their legal and corporate governance moorings. The move to “neutrality, or the “absence from bias, in accounting has been driven by the desire of international standard setters to converge with US standards. But the origins and aims of accounting in the US are very different from those in Europe.

2005年“国际财务报告准则(IFRS)在欧洲的强制推行，特别是将“中立的重要性置于“审慎之上的做法，导致会计准则与相关法律和公司治理准则相脱节。在会计准则上转向“中立或者“无偏向性的做法，受到国际准则制定者希望与美国准则趋同这种愿望的驱使。但美国会计制度的起源和目标与欧洲大为不同。

In Europe, accounts were rooted in a governance system that emphasised stewardship and ownership, and depended on prudence and realisable values to ensure the protection of capital.

在欧洲，会计制度的基础是一套强调监督管理权和所有权的治理体系，并依赖于审慎原则和可变现价值来确保资本得到保护。

By contrast, in the US accounts evolved to facilitate trading in securities markets, which meant that more weight was given to neutrality and market valuations. It is not possible to have accounts that are both consistently prudent (emphasising judgment to avoid overstating capital or income) and neutral (emphasising current market valuations to eliminate “bias). The imposition of US-style “neutrality in Europe has removed the glue that binds together accounting and corporate governance.

相比之下，在美国，会计制度的发展旨在为证券市场的交易活动提供便利，这意味着要更侧重中立性和市场估值。一贯审慎且中立的会计报表是不可能存在的，审慎原则着重于判断，力求避免夸大资本或收入，中立原则侧重当前市场估值，力求消除“偏见。美国式的“中立原则在欧洲的强制推行，切断了将会计和公司治理联系在一起的纽带。

IFRS has been particularly pernicious in banking. In the run-up to the financial crisis, banks were prevented under IFRS from provisioning for expected loan losses. They were instead required to implement an “incurred loan loss provisioning model, which only permitted funds to be set aside for loans that were already going bad. Under IFRS, because riskier loans are associated with higher interest payments, banks are able to “cash in higher margins up front without allowing for the costs of expected defaults. In effect, banks’ accounts fail to present a “true and fair view of their economic health.

在银行业，IFRS尤为有害。在此次金融危机之前，根据该准则，银行被禁止为预期的贷款损失进行拨备。它们反而被要求实行“已发生的贷款损失拨备模式，只允许为已经变为坏账的贷款做出拨备。根据该准则，因为对于风险较高的贷款来说所需支付的利息也会更高，所以银行能够在不考虑预期违约成本的情况下提前“实现更高的利润率。实际上，银行的会计报表未能就其财务健康状况提供“真实且公允意见。

Meanwhile, banking executives, whose bonuses are often tied to short-term profits, were incentivised to expand lending rapidly, often lending of the riskier variety. Mark-to-market (and mark-to-model) valuations of bank trading books, unconstrained by a high level requirement for prudence, added fuel to the fire.

与此同时，奖金往往与短期利润挂钩的银行业高管有动机迅速扩大贷款投放，而且通常是风险较高的贷款类别。根据按市值计价(Mark-to-market)——以及按模型计价(Mark to Model)——的方法对银行交易账簿进行估值，在不受高度审慎原则约束的情况下，让问题变得更加严重。

In principle, the banks’ auditors should have been able to override accounts that failed to deliver a true and fair view. In practice, the emphasis on compliance with IFRS has deterred company directors and auditors from using their professional judgment to invoke the “true and fair override. This has been exacerbated by structural failures in the audit market that have undermined auditors’ independence and their willingness to challenge company executives.

原则上来说，银行审计师原本可以对那些未能提供真实且公允意见的会计报表给出否定意见。但在实务上，为了遵守IFRS准则的要求，公司董事和审计师难以利用他们的专业判断，对不符合“真实且公允原则的报表给出否定意见。审计市场的结构性失灵加剧了这种情况，结构性失灵破坏了审计师的独立性，削弱了他们挑战公司高管的意愿。

According to research by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, UK banks that failed between 2008 and 2010 lost almost double their reported capital in 2007. In other words, shareholders’ equity was wiped out almost twice over. This scale of losses – and the concurrent bonus payments – could not have built up under a prudent accounting system.

根据地方养老基金论坛(Local Authority Pension Fund Forum)的研究，2008年至2010年期间破产的英国银行，在2007年的亏损额几乎是资本金的两倍。换句话说，股东权益被彻底消灭了近两次。在审慎的会计体系下，这一亏损规模——以及同时出现的奖金支出——原本不会形成。

As long-term shareholders, prudent accounts provide the basis for us to fulfil our responsibilities of stewardship. They are also vital to support economic stability, through their impacts on investor confidence and executive behaviour. It is time policy makers in the UK and the European Union re-examined whether IFRS rules are delivering the right results for shareholders, for companies – and for economic growth.

作为长期股东，审慎的会计报表会为我们履行监督责任奠定基矗此外，通过对投资者信心以及高管行为的影响，它们对于支撑经济稳定也很重要。英国和欧盟(EU)决策者现在应重新考察一下：IFRS准则是否为股东、公司以及经济增长带来正面影响。

The writers are respectively head of UK equities at USS Investment Management and chief investment officer at Royal London Asset Management

本文作者分别是USS Investment Management英国股票部主管和皇家伦敦资产管理(Royal London Asset Management)首席投资官