英国应向加拿大学什么？

Canada’s financial system emerged from the global crisis with a strong international reputation. Its banks avoided the all-out panic that struck in some jurisdictions. While they received important and timely liquidity assistance from government agencies during the worst months of the meltdown (through a C$200bn “Extraordinary Financing Framework), no banks failed or needed to be taken over by the state. This relative stability has been an important strength for Canada’s economy in subsequent years.

加拿大金融系统摆脱全球危机的经历在国际上有口皆碑。加拿大的银行避免了侵袭其他地区的全面恐慌。虽然在灾难最严重的时期，它们获得了政府机构及时提供的重要流动性援助——过一项规模为2000亿加元的“特别融资框架(EFF)——但没有一家银行倒闭或者需要国家接管。这种相对稳定性是其后数年加拿大经济的一个重要优势。

Now the man who oversaw the Canadian system during this turbulent period is crossing the Atlantic to become the next governor of the Bank of England. Mark Carney took the reins of the Bank of Canada in February 2008 – just as the world system was sliding into crisis. By importing a Canadian central banker, will Britain also import Canadian financial stability?

在这段动荡时期负责监督加拿大金融体系的人如今将穿越大西洋，前往英国出任英国央行(BoE)的下一任行长。马克·卡尼(Mark Carney)于2008年2月开始掌管加拿大央行(Bank of Canada)，当时全球金融体系正在陷入危机。英国在引进一位加拿大央行家的同时，是否也将“引进加拿大的金融稳定性？

Mr Carney is respected for both his credibility and his creativity(a rare combination in the staid world of central banking). However, Canada’s relatively positive experience in recent years ultimately owes more to the structure of Canadian banking regulation than to the traits of its top overseer. It is from this that Britain should learn.

卡尼的可靠性和创造性受到尊敬（在刻板的央行领域，二者兼备难能可贵）。然而，归根结底，近年来加拿大相对良好的表现更多地应归功于加拿大的银行监管架构，而不是最高监督者的才能。这才是英国应该学习的。

Canada’s banking industry is highly concentrated, dominated by five large full-service banks that control more than 85 per cent of national bank lending. This market power translates into dependable profit margins. Canadian banks never fully embraced the credit-fuelled derivatives that brought down so many other banks – precisely because they were not so desperate for unconventional trading profit given the consistent profitability of their traditional asset portfolios.

加拿大银行业高度集中，五大全能型银行控制着全国85%以上的银行信贷投放。这种强势的市场格局保证了可靠的利润率。加拿大银行业从未完全接受导致众多银行破产的信用衍生产品——因为他们的传统资产组合具有稳定盈利能力，所以他们对非传统交易的利润不是那么渴求。

This private-sector success owes a great deal to an extensive web of state regulation, protection and support. It depends especially on the following five aspects.

加拿大私营部门取得这样的成功，在很大程度上归功于该国具备一个覆盖广泛的政府监管、保护和支持体系，尤其得益于以下五个方面。

First, longstanding limits on asset-to-capital leverage, which cap leverage at about 20-to-1 and go well beyond Basel requirements. The proven success of these leverage caps underpins Mr Carney’s support for similar global limits in debates at the Financial Stability Board (which he chairs) and other forums.

首先，长期的杠杆限制措施，把资产对资本比率上限控制在20比1左右，远高于《巴塞尔协议》(Basel)的要求。这些杠杆上限被证明是成功的，为卡尼在金融稳定委员会(Financial Stability Board)及其他论坛的相关辩论中支持在全球采取类似限制措施提供了依据。

Second, a system of universal deposit insurance, managed by the publicly owned Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, that prevented any substantial outbreak of depositor anxiety, even during the worst months of the crisis.

其次，通用存款保险制度防止了储户中间爆发大规模恐慌，即使在危机最严重的时期也是如此。该制度由公有性质的加拿大存款保险公司(Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation)管理实施。

Third, most mortgages written by Canadian banks are insured by another state-owned body, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. This insurance stopped a sudden drop in investor confidence in Canada’s widely collateralised mortgages. Then, during the crisis, the Canadian government instructed CMHC to buy back about C$70bn of the mortgages it had already insured, injecting liquidity into the banks at a crucial moment.

第三，加拿大银行发放的多数抵押贷款由另一家国有机构——加拿大抵押贷款和住房公司(Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation，CMHC)承保。这项保险防止了投资者对加拿大广泛担保的抵押贷款突然失去信心。而且，在危机期间，加拿大政府指示CMHC回购它已担保的约700亿加元抵押贷款，在关键时期为银行业注入了流动性。

Fourth, through the CMHC’s insurance system, the state regulates the quality of new mortgages. To qualify for insurance, mortgages must meet minimum standards regarding downpayments and amortisation. This will help Canada to avoid a future free-fall in housing prices. Canadian property is clearly overvalued, especially in Vancouver and Toronto, after four years of near-zero interest rates. But the superior quality of most Canadian mortgages means the market, already cooling off, is less likely to suddenly freeze.

第四，通过CMHC的保险体系，政府对新增抵押贷款的质量进行监管。要具备保险资格，抵押贷款必须满足有关首付和分期付款的最低标准。这将帮助加拿大避免未来出现房价暴跌。由于过去4年来利率处于近零水平，加拿大房产显然是被高估的，尤其在温哥华和多伦多地区。但加拿大绝大部分抵押贷款都属于优质贷款，这意味着已经冷却下来的市场不大可能突然冰冻。

Fifth, the major banks are protected against hostile takeover through government rules that require dispersed Canadian ownership of their equity. This further insulated Canadian banks from global pressure during the acquisition frenzy of the early 2000s.

第五，有关要求加拿大人分散持有国内主要银行股权的政府规定使这些银行免于受到敌意收购。在本世纪头十年初期全球兴起的收购狂潮中，这进一步为加拿大银行业隔开了压力。

In short, Canada’s banking system demonstrates the virtues of interventionist and flexible government regulation and public ownership. These features long predate the election of Canada’s current Conservative government in 2006. Conservative officials, ironically, now muse about selling off the very assets (such as CMHC) that helped to keep the system resilient.

简而言之，加拿大银行体系融合了干预主义、灵活的政府监管与公共所有制的优点。这些特点早在本届加拿大保守党政府于2006年当选时就已经存在了。讽刺的是，保守党官员现在考虑出售这些令加拿大银行体系保有活力的资产（如CMHC）。

These strengths also predate Mr Carney’s tenure at the Bank of Canada. He has been creative and flexible in steering the Canadian financial system. As chairman of the FSB, he has doggedly pursued the global regulation agenda, overriding sometimes loud objections from self-interested bankers. He is talented, dedicated and approachable; Britain’s gain is clearly Canada’s loss.

同样，这些优点在卡尼掌管加拿大央行之前就已存在。他在引领加拿大金融体系方面富于创造性，手段灵活。作为金融稳定委员会主席，他坚持推进全球监管议程，不去管自利的银行家时而强烈的反对之声。他才华横溢、克尽职责又随和可亲。英国的收获显然是加拿大的损失。

However, if Britons are truly interested in emulating the relative stability of Canada’s financial systemthey will need to do more than poach our central banker. They will need to copy our use of state regulation and public ownership to stabilise a system that, left to its own devices, would likely collapse again.

不过，如果英国人真的有意复制加拿大金融体系的相对稳定性，他们应付出更多努力，而不仅仅是满足于挖走我们加拿大的央行行长。他们需要效仿我们利用政府监管和公共所有制来稳定金融体系的做法，这个体系，如果放任它自行其是，很可能会再次崩塌。

The writer is an economist for the Canadian Auto Workers union and the founding chairperson of the Progressive Economics Forum

本文作者是加拿大汽车工人工会(Canadian Auto Workers union)的经济学家、进步经济学论坛(Progressive Economics Forum)创始主席