声誉是银行的“硬通货”

The humbling of two global banks in recent weeks has been greeted very differently on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Still, from the perspective of either side, large fines for interest rate rigging by Swiss bank UBS, and money-laundering by HSBC, point to the same conclusion: from now on, banks must protect their reputations as their most valuable asset.

最近几周，两家国际银行的丑闻在大西洋两岸引起了截然不同的反响。尽管如此，不管从哪一个方面来看，瑞银(UBS)操纵利率、汇丰银行(HSBC)洗钱而分别受重罚，都指向同样的结论：从现在开始，银行必须将自己的声誉作为最重要的资产加以保护。

On the US side, there has been considerable grumbling about the “lenient treatment meted out to HSBC and UBS . Associations with Mexican drug cartels and Iranian militants or documented solicitation of price fixing usually attract the attention of federal prosecutors. Yet, while UBS’s Japanese subsidiary did plead guilty to one criminal count and two of its employees face charges, not a single HSBC employee faces any form of criminal or civil sanction. Nor has the parent entity been charged in either case. Given similar recent problems at Barclays and Standard Chartered the question from the US perspective becomes: Why are British and European banks not more law compliant?

从美国方面来看，人们对汇丰和瑞银受到的“宽大处理非常不满。与墨西哥贩毒集团和伊朗好战分子的任何牵连，或者是教唆价格操纵的记录往往都会引起联邦检察官的注意。然而，尽管瑞银日本子公司就一项刑事指控认罪，其两名员工也面临指控，却没有一名汇丰员工受到任何形式的刑事或者民事制裁。两家银行的母公司也没有受到指控。鉴于巴克莱(Barclays)和渣打(Standard Chartered)最近出现的类似问题，美国方面提出的疑问就是：为什么英国和欧洲大陆的银行未能更加守法？

From the British side concern is growing about the “punitive nature of American enforcement. Why is the US “obsessed with criminal prosecutions? In the US the idea that “too big to fail means “too big to prosecute has become politically unacceptable. But in the UK there remains a fear that criminal prosecutions could lead to a major bank failure, potentially destabilising international banking and chilling economic recovery.

而从英国方面来看，人们越来越担忧美国执法中的“惩罚性质。为什么美国“沉迷于刑事诉讼呢？在美国，“大到不能倒意味着“大到不能被起诉的想法，在政治上是不能接受的。但在英国，人们仍然担忧，刑事诉讼可能会导致影响重大的银行破产，进而给国际银行业带来不稳定、放慢经济复苏的步伐。

These rival perspectives dovetail with longstanding differences in approaches to enforcement. The US remains committed to a deterrent orientation for law enforcement. From this perspective, one best prevents misbehaviour through aggressive enforcement and the prospect of penalties that exceed the expected gain from wrongdoing.

这种对立的视角与双方在执法上的长期差异是一致的。美国在执法上一直都遵从一种“威慑的倾向。从这个角度来看，制止不当行为的最好方式，就是强有力的执法以及高于预期不当收益的可能惩罚。

In the UK, financial regulators have long believed in quiet admonitions and private censure. Although few still talk openly about “light touch regulation in the UK, the philosophy remains that one should minimise regulatory intrusions into the marketplace. From this perspective, the appropriate goal of policy is to change the culture of a delinquent institution so that it becomes more compliant with the law. This implies that one should use the least drastic means necessary.

在英国，金融监管者长期以来都秉持“默默警告和“私下谴责的做法。尽管英国现在很少有人公开谈论“点到为止式的监管，人们还是信奉市场的监管干预要最小化。从这点来看，政策的合理目标就是改变有过失行为机构的文化，从而使其更加遵从法律。这意味着应该尽量避免使用极端的手段。

Although the “light touch did not work with HSBC, which persisted in wrongdoing, its final settlement with US and UK regulators incorporated this gentler, rehabilitative approach. HSBC’s senior management is now populated with compliance officials from regulators in an attempt to change the institutional culture. It is as if financial regulators decided to colonise the “rogue institution, compelling it to import persons of a “proper compliance temperament.

尽管“点到为止式的监管没有运用到一直在犯错的汇丰银行，但它与美国和英国监管机构的最终和解就融入了这种柔和的、复原的立常汇丰的高级管理层中现在有大量来自监管机构的合规官员，旨在改变其机构文化。似乎金融监管机构决定将这一“流氓机构殖民化，强迫其吸收一些有着“适当合规气质的人员。

A straw in this same wind is Barclays’ decision to hire Hector Sants, the former head of the Financial Services Authority, as its new compliance chief.

与之类似，巴克莱决定聘请英国金融服务管理局(Financial Services Authority)前首席执行官赫克托·桑特(Hector Sants)为其新的合规负责人。

What do these differences in enforcement styles between the US and the UK imply for global banking? In all likelihood, these differences will persist. UBS’s market price barely moved after its Japanese subsidiary was charged, undercutting the claim that prosecuting a bank implies its failure. That may encourage US regulators to be more aggressive.

美国和英国在执法风格上的不同对全球银行业来说意味着什么？这些区别注定将继续下去。瑞银日本子公司遭受指控之后，瑞银市值几乎没有变化，因此银行被起诉就意味着破产的说法很难站住脚。这可能会促使美国监管者执法更加有力。

Global banks must anticipate more aggressive enforcement, as they cannot escape the US market. This means that investment in a robust compliance system is essential. But robust compliance begins with “the tone at the top. Chief executives of global banks will need to recognise that, like Caesar’s wife, they have to be above suspicion. Part of UBS’s continuing problem is that its co-CEOs cannot seem to escape some supervisory responsibility for its role in manipulating interbank lending rates. Only if senior management is clearly on the “side of the angels is there much chance that a major bank can avoid future punitive treatment in the US if its underlings cross the line.

国际银行必须准备好迎接更有力的执法，因为它们无法避开美国市常这意味着投资建立稳健的合规体系非常关键。但稳健的合规是从“高层基调开始的。国际银行的首席执行官们需要意识到，他们应该像凯撒(Caesar)的妻子一样让人无可怀疑。瑞银一个持续存在的问题就是，其联合首席执行官们似乎难逃操控银行间拆借利率的监督责任。只有高级管理层真正站在“天使的一边，大型银行才可能在分支机构逾越了界限的时候，在美国避免遭遇惩罚。

Reputation always counted. But in future it will mean much more than personal honesty and candour (which were always valued). It will also mean a zealous, no-nonsense approach to compliance with near-zero tolerance for misconduct.

声誉一直非常重要。但未来这不仅意味着个人的诚信和正直（这一直以来都受到重视），同时也意味着积极、严肃地遵循对不当行为的零容忍立常

This will become clearer as events unfold. Regulatory penalties in the Libor scandal are only the first step. Private enforcement through class actions and other lawsuits in the US may raise the costs of that scandal by an order of magnitude. The investment banks serving Enron eventually paid more than $7.5bn to settle the class action against them.

随着事态的进展，这点将越来越清晰。伦敦银行间同业拆借利率(Libor)丑闻中的监管惩罚只是第一步。在美国，通过集体诉讼和其他诉讼开展的私人执法可能会大幅提高这一丑闻带来的成本。为安然公司(Enron)服务的投资银行，最终就为了结针对它们的集体诉讼支付了75亿美元。

In such an environment, financial institutions need to signal credibly to the market that they are law compliant. No rational manager tolerates misconduct when the expected costs exceed the expected benefits. But avoiding cost-inefficient misconduct alone is not enough. The signal must be clear: involvement in misconduct must be career-ending, even for those who only failed to supervise adequately. For large financial institutions who have evaded the sunlight of disclosure (often with regulatory acquiescence), the transition will be difficult.

在这种环境下，金融机构需要向市场发出一个可信的信号：它们是遵循法律的。没有一个理性的高管能容忍代价高于收益的不当行为。但仅仅避免没有经济效益的不当行为还是不够的。必须明确：参与不当行为就必然意味着终结职业生涯，即使对于那些只是没能恰当履行监督职责的人来说也是如此。对于那些逃避信息披露（往往有着监管默许）的大型金融机构来说，这种过渡将是比较困难的。

In the UK, the same bottom line follows: as the public has become suspicious of large banks, reputation becomes critical, both as the glue that holds together organisational culture and as the deciding factor in enforcement negotiations.

英国应该有着同样的底线：公众对大型银行越来越不信任，因而声誉就显得非常关键，它既是凝聚机构文化的“胶水，也是执法协商中的决定性因素。

As the value of reputation grows, much may change. The path to the top of banks may shift. Regulatory experience may be valued more highly, rather than indicating that an executive is only suited to second-tier responsibilities in compliance.

随着声誉价值的增加，很多东西可能都会改变。在银行中爬到顶层的道路或许也将转变。监管经验可能会更受重视，合规职责不再只是高管的次要职责。

Above all, global banks will need to compete not only over the price and quality of their services, but over reputation. And in the competition to reach the top, the future global bank chief executive will increasingly be the person who can best enhance that reputation.

总之，国际银行将不仅需要在服务价格和质量上竞争，还需要在声誉上一比高低。在登顶银行管理层的较量中，未来国际银行首席执行官的人选，将越来越是最能提升银行声誉的人。

The writer is the Adolf A. Berle professor of law and director of the Center on Corporate Governance at Columbia University

本文作者是美国哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)阿道夫·A·伯利(Adolf A. Berle)法学教授和企业治理中心(Center on Corporate Governance)主任。