2015考研英语阅读代价高昂的铁证

　　The LIBOR probes; Anexpensive smoking gun

　　伦敦银行间拆放款利率调查;代价高昂的铁证

　　Court documents shed light on how LIBOR wasallegedly manipulated;

　　法院公文阐明伦敦银行间拆放款利率是如何涉嫌操纵;

　　It is supposed to be constructed using banks ownhonest estimates of what it costs for them toborrow money. But regulators around the worldsuspect that LIBOR , a financial benchmark that is set every day by collating these estimates, hasbeen subject to manipulation. Little information has been publicly released by the regulatorsthat are investigating. But Canadian and American legal documents seen by The Economistpaint a picture of what is alleged. It is not pretty.

　　银行自己诚实的估算其借贷成本本是很有建设性的。但世界各地的监管机构怀疑伦敦银行间拆放款利率，这一根据估算结果而每天确立的金融基准涉嫌操纵。负责调查的监管机构并没有公开过多内幕。但是《经济学人》了解到的加拿大和美国的法律公文描述了这些未经证实的指控，说的有些不堪入耳。

　　Suspicions that something was wrong with LIBOR were aroused in 2008 when financial risksbegan to pick up but the benchmark, which ought to have ticked upwards too, did not move.That same year a group of American academics circulated a paper showing that banks individual estimates of their borrowing costs were surprisingly close, given their differentlevels of risk. That suggested something fishy but was not conclusive proof, according toRosa Abrantes-Metz of New York University Stern School of Business, one of the paper sauthors.

　　对伦敦银行间拆放款利率的指控在2008年就有了，当时金融危机开始抬头，但本应一同上涨的利率基准却没有变化。同一年，在一群美国学者间转播着的一篇文章显示，考虑到不同程度的风险，银行出人意料的停止了自己的借款成本估算。这就验证了可疑的，但又未经证实的证据，文章作者之一，纽约大学斯特恩商学院的Rosa Abrantes-Metz称。

　　A case brought by the Canadian Competition Bureau provides harder evidence that somebanks submissions were being manipulated. The court documents suggest that a group oftraders regularly contacted one another to discuss how to influence the yen LIBOR rate. Iftrue, that would have breached two principles. One is that traders from different banks shouldnot be aligning their positions in this way. The other is that traders are supposed to beseparated from staff within the same bank who estimate LIBOR.

　　加拿大竞争管理局的一个案例提供了说明一些银行的申报书被篡改的铁证。法院公文称一些交易员定期联系另外一些交易员来商讨如何改变日元拆借利率。如果情况属实，那么就违反了两项原则。其一是不同银行的交易员不应该以这种方式调整他们的仓位。另一点是交易员本应该和同家银行负责估算伦敦银行间拆放款利率的交易员分离开。

　　The case filing summarises messages sent by Trader A, an employee of an unnamedwhistle-blowing bank. Many institutions are implicated in the document but the followingexcerpt cites RBS to show how the alleged scheme worked:

　　这个满是总结性信息的案例是由交易员甲，一名匿名揭发银行内幕的雇员提供的。该文书称许多机构涉嫌操纵，但接下来的一段摘录引用到苏格兰皇家银行显示了所谓的方案是如何实施的：

　　Trader A explained to one RBS IRD trader who his collusive contacts were and how he hadand was going to manipulate Yen LIBOR. Trader A also communicated his trading positions,his desire for a certain movement in Yen LIBOR and gave instructions for the RBS IRDtrader to get RBS to make Yen LIBOR submissions consistent with Trader A s wishes. TheRBS IRD trader acknowledged these communications and confirmed that he would followthrough. Trader A and the RBS IRD trader also entered into transactions that aligned theirtrading interests in regards to Yen LIBOR.

　　交易员甲向一位苏格兰皇家银行税务交易员交代其同伙是谁和他曾经和即将如何操纵日元拆借利率。交易员甲也告知了他的交易仓位，他是如何渴望调整日元拆借利率并指使苏格兰皇家银行税务交易员说服皇家银行，让日元拆借利率与交易员甲的期望值一致。税务员得到这些指示，确认他会依照行事。交易员甲和税务员也在关于日元拆借交易方面的贸易利息上进行交易。

　　RBS says that it has legal and factual defences against such claims.

　　苏格兰皇家银行称其有合法的事实依据为其平反。

　　The Canadian case opens a window into how LIBOR manipulation may have happened. Civilcases brought by banks customers in America suggest who might have suffered if the ratewas being gamed.

　　加拿大案例为调查伦敦银行操纵间拆放款利率的经过提供了线索。在美国由银行客户起诉的民事案件表明如果利率被操纵，谁会是受害者。

　　These cases can be grouped into four types, according to Bill Butterfield and Anthony Maton ofHausfeld, a law firm. First, there are large individual investment firms seeking damages ontheir own. The other three types of case are brought by customers acting as groups. Onegroup includes traders who were on the wrong side of LIBOR bets. A second group includesinvestors in large companies LIBOR-linked debt who may have lost out on interest paymentsif LIBOR was set too low.

　　根据 Hausfeld的一家名为Bill Butterfield and Anthony Maton的法律公司称，这些案例可以归为四类。第一类是，大型的个人投资公司自己寻求赔偿。剩下的三类是客户团体提出的。其中一组包括在伦敦银行间拆放款利率上判断错误的交易员们。第二组是负担与该利率有关联的债务的大公司的投资商，如果拆放款利率定的过低，他们就会失去支付利息的能力。

　　The final group is made up of customers that bought interest-rate swaps from banks. Thisgroup includes the city of Baltimore, which is represented by Hausfeld and whose case isespecially revealing.

　　最后的一组是由和银行交换利率的客户组成。这一组包括巴尔的摩市，其代表是Hausfeld和那些被揭露案例的银行。

　　American cities borrow to finance the construction of large-scale public works like roadsand sewerage systems. They can borrow most cheaply at floating rates but this option lacksthe stability that fixed-rate borrowing gives. Swaps can help them get the best of bothworlds. The city first borrows at a low floating rate. It then buys an interest-rate swap from abank. Under the swap deal it receives a LIBOR floating rate which cancels out the payments itmust make to investors in its debt. In exchange the city pays the bank a fixed rate.

　　美国的城市借钱来资助大型公共工程建设，比如道路和排水系统。它们在浮动利率较低的时候买入，但这个买卖特权缺乏像固定利率借款所具备的稳定性。利率掉期可以帮助它们两者兼得。市政府首先在浮动利率低时借款，然后利率掉期时从银行买入。在掉期交易时，它得到伦敦银行间拆放款浮动利率，就可以抵消掉它必须要还清投资者当初支付的债务。于是交易时，市政府按固定利率给银行还款。

　　Baltimore entered into over $100m in interest-rate swaps, according to case documents.Lower LIBOR-linked payments to the city would have meant less money to cover theoutgoing fixed-rate payments. If LIBOR was artificially suppressed, the city would havebeen losing millions annually.

　　根据案例文书所称，巴尔的摩在利率掉期时投入了1亿美元。市政府低间拆放款利率的付款意味着用更少的钱来填补外向固定利率的付款。如果伦敦银行间拆放款利率被人为的制止住，那么该城市每年将损失数百万美元。

　　If the case is upheld, damages could be big. The American cases are being pursued underclass action litigation. This means that if Baltimore s case is upheld other cities sold thesame products will also be able to claim damages. Across America 40 states allowmunicipalities to enter into swap agreements. The total estimated amount in 2010 was $250billion-500 billion, according to an IMF paper. What s more, cases are being brought under theSherman Act, America s antitrust law, which allows for triple damages. Assume the worst anddamages for American cities alone could go as high as $40 billion.

　　如果该案例胜诉，损失就是巨大的。美国的案例是被集体诉讼所追究的，这意味着，如果巴尔的摩案例胜诉，其他销售同类产品的城市就可以要求赔偿损失。美国的40个州允许市政公债签订通货互换协定。根据世界货币基金组织的文件称，2010年的总估算量是2.5亿-5亿美元。而且，被纳入美国反垄断法《谢尔曼法》的案件允许三重损害。如果做最坏的估算，会给美国城市带来高达400亿美元的损失。